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WHY INCENTIVES FOR “PATENT HOLDOUT”
THREATEN TO DISMANTLE FRAND, AND WHY IT
MATTERS
Richard A. Epstein† & Kayvan B. Noroozi††

ABSTRACT
An increasing number of judges, legislators, and scholars, particularly in the United
States, have wrongly come to believe that the commitment that standard-essential patents
be licensed on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms” (“FRAND”) was principally
created to advance the interests of technology implementers, and have too often given a
preference toward implementers’ interests in interpreting FRAND agreements. That
premise has led American courts to take a categorically hostile view toward awarding
injunctions against implementers who infringe valid standard-essential patents, fearing that
the injunctive remedy would give innovators undue leverage. Indeed, American courts
have been so unilaterally concerned with innovators’ conduct that some have even allowed
implementers to sue innovators simply for making an opening licensing offer that is later
deemed “too high,” even if the implementer refused to make any counteroffer at all. An
implementer–centric view of FRAND has also caused several courts to conclude that
innovators are not entitled to any share of the commercial benefits arising from the
standardization of their technologies, and that all such benefits must go to implementers
alone.
This Article argues that an implementer–centric view of FRAND’s origins and
purposes is false. FRAND is a contractual agreement that reflects a voluntary reciprocal
exchange of benefits and obligations driven by the need to solve significant coordination
problems in the face of otherwise prohibitive transaction costs. As part of that bargain,
innovators agree to disclose their latest, confidential discoveries to standard–development
organizations and to waive their injunction rights as to eventual patents on those
discoveries, in exchange for contractual protection against “patent holdout” by
implementers. Those implementers are then permitted to use standard–essential patents on
the condition that they agree to pay fair and adequate royalties for that use, with the royalty
amount to be set through mutual good–faith negotiations.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38WD3Q19B
© 2017 Richard A. Epstein and Kayvan B. Noroozi.
† Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall
Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School.
†† Principal at Noroozi PC and CEO of Koios Pharmaceuticals LLC. The author is
trial counsel to Core Wireless Licensing S.a.r.l. in litigation against LG Electronics and
Apple with respect to FRAND-committed standard-essential patents. The views expressed
in this Article, however, are entirely the author’s and were not discussed with or supported
by any client or company.
The authors thank Bijan Aboutorabi, Philip Cooper, Jeremy Rozansky and John
Tienken of the University of Chicago Law School for their excellent research assistance.

1382

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1381

Accordingly, this Article stresses that FRAND is not intended to be, and should not be
interpreted as, a one-sided transfer from innovators to implementers. Rather, implementers
too owe a significant duty to negotiate FRAND licenses in good faith—a duty that many
courts have overlooked and underenforced. This Article demonstrates that implementers’
good faith obligations are a critical component of the basic FRAND architecture and that
enforcement of those obligations is strictly necessary to the continued development of
innovation–driven standards.
This Article further observes that the FRAND bargain is not simply meant to give
innovators a way to monetize their intellectual property. Rather, and perhaps more
significantly, FRAND creates an agreed bargaining framework that allows implementers
to access innovators’ otherwise–confidential discoveries—inventions so recent that they
are not otherwise disclosed in patents or published applications. In this way, FRAND
supplies a solution to an iteration of Kenneth Arrow’s paradox of information, enabling the
standards development effort to yield commercial benefits that would not exist absent
innovators’ voluntary participation. Stated otherwise, innovators agree to give
implementers access—and a fair license—to their most groundbreaking technologies
because innovators believe that implementers will reciprocally later agree to take a license
in good faith for using those highly–valuable innovations. This Article shows both
theoretically and empirically that courts’ failure to appreciate these aspects of the FRAND
bargain, combined with their overreliance on liability rules (i.e., damages over injunctions)
incentivizes the very patent holdout problem FRAND was intended to avoid. That
“efficient infringement” outcome, in turn, has motivated innovators to reduce their
participation in FRAND bargains, threatening to unravel a massive innovation–
commercialization marketplace and its innumerable positive externalities for all parties.
To reverse these harms, this Article recommends that courts automatically issue an
injunction where an implementer is found to infringe valid FRAND–committed patents
that it did not attempt to license in good faith. This Article also recommends that a proper
FRAND licensing rate should include some portion of the benefits achieved through
standardization of the innovations in question.
More broadly, this Article suggests that courts, policymakers, and academic
commentators have wrongly favored implementation over innovation—“things” over
ideas—unwisely frustrating the emergence of an “ideas economy” that should rightly
assign significant profits to upstream innovators and not to the low–margin manufacturing
firms that specialize in turning those innovations into tangible products.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In this Article, we wade into an intellectual thicket that ultimately
reduces to one question: How should courts and policymakers interpret and
allocate the corresponding rights and obligations on both sides of the
FRAND bargain—that is, the contractual agreement between technology
innovators1 and implementers2 to license standard–essential patents on fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms? And more specifically, to what
degree should courts and policymakers continue to fear the possibility of
“patent holdup”—a chief concern underlying a number of regulatory and
judicial interventions in the space for more than a decade—as opposed to
the countervailing risk of “patent holdout” or “efficient infringement”?
This issue has made it right to the top of the political agenda. As this
Article was being prepared for publication, its topic became the subject of
an address on March 16, 2018 by Makan Delrahim, the Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust. In a speech titled, The “New Madison” Approach to
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, Mr. Delrahim relied on an earlier
draft of this Article to support, among other points, the observation that
1. An “innovator” company may also be an “implementer,” or may focus purely on
developing innovations. As used herein, the relevant characteristic of an “innovator” is its
ability, on net, to export innovation to others in the industry.
2. As used herein, the term “implementer” refers to a company that is responsible
for manufacturing and/or commercializing products for sale to end users. The term does
not exclude the possibility that an “implementer” company may also be an “innovator,”
either in the same market or in some downstream market.
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“proponents of using antitrust law to police FRAND commitments
principally rely on models devoid of economic or empirical evidence that
hold-up is a real phenomenon, much less one that harms competition.”3 The
chief function of this Article is to make good on that proposition by offering
a comprehensive discussion of the considerations that have led both Mr.
Delrahim, and us, to reach that conclusion. In particular, we demonstrate
and conclude that courts and policymakers in the United States should be
far more concerned with the risk of “patent holdout”—a problem they have
not only largely overlooked, but have actually exacerbated through a series
of missteps in recent years.
We use the terms “patent holdup” and “patent holdout” as they have
been used in the extensive patent literature, and in the general economics
literature on holdup and holdout problems. In general, by “patent holdup”
we mean the theoretical claim that innovators of standard–essential patents
attempt to extract excessively large royalties from implementers after those
implementers have committed to a particular technological standard that
requires the use of the patent(s) in question—that is, a standard that renders
the patent(s) “essential.” Under the “patent holdup” theory, the royalties in
question are excessively large because they exceed the “true” value of the
invention(s) in question, and are derived (so the theory goes) because the
innovator can leverage the implementer’s sunk cost in committing to the
standard to extract more than a fair royalty.4 By “patent holdout” we mean
the converse problem—that an implementer refuses to negotiate in good
faith with an innovator for a license to valid patent(s) that the implementer
infringes, and instead forces the innovator to either undertake significant
litigation costs and time delays to extract a licensing payment through a
court order, or else to simply drop the matter because the licensing game is
no longer worth the candle. We also use the term “efficient infringement”
synonymously with “patent holdout” here.
The “holdout” or “efficient infringement” problem is, of course, not
limited to the standard-essential patent context or even to patent cases as a
3. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The “New
Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law 9 & n.30 (Mar. 16, 2018),
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download. Our Article was communicated to
Delrahim in a letter of February 13, 2018, which was signed by several academics,
including Epstein. Letter from Jonathan Barnett et al., Professor, USC Gould Sch. of Law,
to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2018/02/Letter-to-DOJ-SupportingEvidence-Based-Approach-to-Antitrust-Enforcement-of-IP.pdf.
4. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
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whole. The ongoing saga between Oracle and Google regarding Google’s
copying of 11,500 lines of Java code indicates that “efficient infringement”
is an (unfortunately) attractive business strategy in the copyright context as
well, where the ability to take another’s computer code while refusing to
pay for a license can result in wealth transfers in the billions of dollars.5 By
way of background, Google failed in 2005 to obtain a license from Sun (now
Oracle) for implementing Java in Android mobile devices.6 When Google
failed in its own efforts to develop critical components on its own, it decided
to lift them from Oracle—copying 11,500 lines of Oracle’s code verbatim
into Android.7 Google then undercut the market for products that
incorporated (or could have incorporated) Oracle’s technology for a fee,
refused to pay Oracle, and chose instead to litigate.8 Thirteen years later, the
dispute continues to work through the courts, despite two trials and two
decisions on appeal. Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit rejected Google’s fair use defense and remanded the case for a trial
to determine the extent of Google’s liability for damages.9 Here is a case
where injunctive relief is called for to stop the theft–Google made all of its
liability arguments and lost. It should have to settle, redesign its products to
eliminate infringement, or be enjoined. Otherwise thirteen years of
litigation can quickly become eighteen, with no end in sight—a modern
version of Dickens’s Bleak House.10 Yet the presiding district court judge—
having twice ruled for Google and been twice reversed—appears to show
little concern for Oracle’s predicament, and is unlikely to exercise his
discretion to award an injunction.
While many of our observations here apply outside the context of
standard-essential patents and FRAND, we nonetheless focus on that
microcosm precisely because the question of FRAND’s proper
interpretation is at the forefront of a number of broader issues that will
ultimately shape this century’s “ideas economy.”
To address that question, Part II begins with an explanation of how
FRAND bargaining was developed and how it functions in the context of
5. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, Nos. 2017-1118, 2017-1202, 2018 WL
1473875, at *19 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2018) (“It is undisputed, however, that Google copied
11,500 lines of code—11,330 more lines than necessary to write in Java.”).
6. See Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1542
(2016) (describing how license “negotiations unraveled” because of “Google’s
unwillingness to agree to make Android fully compatible with the Java platform”).
7. Oracle Am., 2018 WL 1473875, at *19.
8. Id. at *22.
9. Id. at *23–24.
10. In fact, Professor Peter Menell has made this exact comparison in describing the
protracted litigation. See Menell, supra note 6, at 1517–18.

1386

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1381

Standards Developing Organizations (“SDOs”), which establishes the
institutional framework for these negotiations. Part II approaches that
question from its intellectual and factual foundations by first considering
the market forces that engendered the FRAND framework, the nature of the
FRAND agreement, and the purposes it is intended to serve. Part II then
considers how FRAND obligations relate to traditional rate–making
operations of common carriers and public utilities, and the lessons to be
learned from the good–faith bargaining obligations in labor–management
relationships, which are shaped by very different political forces. This
discussion highlights the innumerable benefits that a properly functioning
FRAND regime permits, as well as the mutuality of consideration that is
necessary, both ex ante and ex post, to hold that voluntary regime together.
In particular, at their inception, FRAND obligations arose as contractual
commitments intended to serve the interests of both innovators and
implementers by making both sides to the exchange better off than before.
To be sure, that contractual point has been recognized in the abstract in
many cases,11 but nonetheless it has been insufficiently appreciated in
application. A proper understanding of FRAND principles thus begins not
with a view toward patent law, antitrust law, or regulatory policy, but with
reference to the underlying contractual architecture and quid pro quo of the
FRAND bargain. Since FRAND contracts are willing agreements between
highly competent parties, it logically follows that such agreements,
correctly interpreted, must generate valuable benefits to innovators and
implementers alike.
No one should underestimate the difficulty of realizing these benefits.
In most situations it is easier to reach an agreement, or to develop a series
of customary practices, when the two parties stand in a symmetrical
relationship with each other as opposed to when they occupy distinct roles.
Thus, the customary obligations of partners to each other are easier to
determine than those of a buyer and seller, or a landlord and tenant, or a
licensor and licensee. In these last three cases, the gains from trade may be
enormous, but it is no longer possible to adopt parallel obligations on both
parties. Therefore, it is necessary to determine how the differences in role

11. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D.
Wash. 2012) (recognizing that FRAND commitments made through standards
development organizations are contractual); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F.
Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (same); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent
Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (same).
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determine obligations, a more complex problem for which the dominant
solution is less clear and harder to ascertain.12
Part III applies these observations to a discussion of the prior academic
contributions and concludes that, in view of the particularly high transaction
costs at play and the significant informational advantage the parties hold
over the courts, a correct and socially efficient treatment of FRAND
disputes should shift the parties’ incentives toward negotiated solutions
through a recognition of strong property rights. To achieve that aim,
injunctions should be the presumptive remedy in infringement actions
involving declared standard–essential patents. The defendant, in turn, can
rebut that presumption (or obviate the question of remedies altogether) upon
a showing that its own pre–suit negotiation conduct was in good faith—that
is, that the defendant either made a good faith licensing offer in view of
FRAND or else was justified in making no offer at all because it has proven
noninfringement or invalidity of the patent(s) in suit. The damages remedy
would occupy a subordinate, yet important position—growing in
significance where mutual good faith discussions have reached a genuine
impasse or when it is necessary to determine compensation for attorneys’
fees that are incurred due to a breach of the patent holder’s good faith
covenant.
By contrast, any principal reliance on liability rules comes out second
best because it is likely to miss the reciprocal benefits underlying the
voluntary FRAND agreement and encourages implementers to engage in
inefficient and opportunistic “holdout” from good faith discussions. With
this in mind, Part III proposes a mixed system that is subtler and more
flexible than an all–or–nothing choice between “property rules” and
“liability rules,” as those terms were used by Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed in their path–breaking article on the subject.13 That
article, in an unspoken artificial limitation, only considered legal remedies
that embodied the pure form of one or the other type of remedy, without
asking what mix of the two forms of relief could outperform the exclusive
reliance on one remedy or the other.14 This approach also diverges from the
writings of commentators like Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro—who have

12. For a discussion in connection with the emergence of custom, see Richard A.
Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of
Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992), dealing with both customary practices and specific
contractual arrangements.
13. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
14. See id. at 1109–11.
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expressed a near–categorical aversion to the injunctive remedy for fear of
the risks of “patent holdup” and “royalty stacking.”15 Instead, it incorporates
the insights of others, like Robert Merges, who have recognized the
superiority of strong property rights as a starting point for resolving the high
transaction costs that are inherent to intellectual property exchanges in
general and patents in particular.16 The FRAND agreement is itself an
example of the positive effect of a presumptive injunctive remedy, for
FRAND obligations owe their existence to the presumption of injunctive
relief. Part III also discusses the example of patent pools, which present
another (and complementary) market solution to the problem of patent
transaction costs, and further counsel against hasty judicial interventions
into the complex machinations of the innovation marketplace.
Finally, Part III describes the detailed empirical studies that have all
come to the same conclusion: theoretical concerns regarding patent holdup
and royalty stacking have not borne out in industries subject to innovation–
driven standardization, such as mobile handsets. Instead, the evidence
points to the sharp lowering of prices, continuous innovation, low aggregate
patent royalty payments, and increasing market penetration.17
Part IV then tests the framework described in Part III against recent
court decisions and an intellectual property rights (“IPR”) policy revision
by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”). 18 In so
doing, it identifies the significant distortions and social inefficiencies that
arise from ex post, one–sided revisionism of the FRAND contract, which
evidences the unjustified preference for liability rules over property rights.
Part IV proposes, in particular, an alternative approach to the IEEE’s policy
revision and to decisions such as Apple v. Motorola19 and Microsoft v.
Motorola20—all of which have failed to take a balanced view of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing underlying the FRAND agreement. In particular,
15. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4.
16. See generally Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994).
17. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1313 (2017); Alexander Galetovic et al., Is There Evidence of an
Anticommons Tragedy in the Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1527(2017)
(noting that the “average cumulative royalty yield from . . . 21 identified patent licensors.
. . . is 3.4 percent”); see also J. Gregory Sidak, Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for
Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 301, 301–02 (2016)
(describing royalty–limiting steps taking by SSOs like the IEEE).
18. IEEE, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.1 at 16 (2017),
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf.
19. 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
20. 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
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implementers should be held to a reciprocal duty to negotiate a FRAND
license in good faith, the breach of which should automatically trigger an
injunction upon a finding that the patents at issue are valid and infringed,
unless the innovator’s pre–suit offer is itself found not to have been in good
faith. In this context, we discuss the European Union Court of Justice’s
decision in Huawei v. ZTE,21 as well as the United Kingdom High Court’s
more recent decision in Unwired Planet v. Huawei,22 both of which have
advanced rules similar to those proposed here. Part IV then turns to a
discussion of another aspect of the IEEE’s policy revision, as well as two
Federal Circuit decisions, which have incorrectly deprived innovators of
any share of the benefits from the standardization of their technological
contributions, creating further distortions in the FRAND framework with
significant negative follow–on effects in the innovation marketplace.
Part V concludes with a broader discussion of the significance of these
issues to the emergence of the “ideas economy,” in which it has become
more critical than ever both to reduce transaction costs around the patent
right and to protect and reward innovation. Part V observes the sharp
disconnect between the philosophical underpinnings of redefining the
FRAND contract in favor of implementers—a primacy of implementation
over innovation—and the much larger forces shaping the future of the
American and global economies. The current preference for, as it were,
“things over ideas” is rooted in an implicit premise captured by the maxim,
“easier said than done.” In other words, because our historical economic
experience has taught that ideas are “easy,” but their execution is difficult,
modern courts and commentators have exhibited a specious attraction to the
notion that “building” tangible objects—even if through means like
programming software—should capture more value than the simple
contribution of “ideas” to that endeavor. Yet this conventional view is
dangerously outdated.
Today, the United States is at the forefront of an ideas economy in which
new forces such as globalization, 3D printing, and robotics (to name a few)
are rapidly rendering it much easier to build an embodiment of a great
innovation than to develop the innovation itself. Thus, for instance, two of
the five top–selling smartphone manufacturers in the world are now Oppo

21. See generally Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477.
22. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Unwired Planet v. Huawei: An English
Perspective on FRAND Royalties, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 10, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/
patent/2017/04/unwired-perspective-royalties.html.
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and Vivo23—relatively new entrants with no history of developing
significant smartphone innovations either as part of SDOs24 or
independently at a device–specific level. As another example, Tesla has
vowed to build fully automated factories in which robots alone will build
its fleet of vehicles without human involvement.25 As yet a third example,
ARM—the company behind the design of virtually every smartphone
processor chip—does not make or sell any actual chips.26 Instead, it designs
groundbreaking and fundamental chip architecture, and licenses its
architectural designs to nearly every major player in the smartphone
space.27
In order for the ideas economy to develop and thrive in its most dynamic
and accessible form, it is imperative that ideas be valued, protected, and
rewarded in accordance with their contributions, without relying on
outdated presuppositions favoring incumbents who own the means of
production.
Thus, as this Article demonstrates, the prevailing mishandling of
FRAND is a trend in precisely the wrong direction. As such, these recent
developments are part of an important and broader misstep away from
protecting and valuing intellectual property at precisely the wrong time.
II.

UNDERSTANDING FRAND: THE MANY GAINS FROM
COOPERATION

The simple fact of standardization, independent of the specifics of any
particular standard and absent any innovation, accrues important benefits to
23. See Worldwide Smartphone Shipments Up 1.0% Year over Year in Third Quarter
Despite Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Recall, According to IDC, INT’L DATA CORP. (Oct. 26,
2016), https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS41882816 (gathering data from
the third quarter of 2016).
24. The ETSI IPR Online Database does not list either Oppo or Vivo among the 239
companies that have declared nearly 200,000 patents related to ETSI’s more than 8,500
cellular telecommunications standards. ETSI IPR Online Database, EUROPEAN
TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., https://ipr.etsi.org/SearchIPRD.aspx (last visited
February 13, 2018) (listing companies inside the “Declaring companies” box on the search
page, which is visible after clicking “confirm to continue” on the disclaimer).
25. See Greg Kumparak, A Glimpse Inside Tesla’s Super Secretive Gigafactory,
TECHCRUNCH (July 29, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/07/29/a-glimpse-inside-teslassuper-secretive-gigafactory/ (quoting Elon Musk’s description of one such factory as “a
machine to build the machines”).
26. See Architectures, Processors, and Devices, ARM at 1-1 to 1-2 (May 19, 2009),
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dht0001a/DHT0001A_architecture_pr
ocessors_and_devices.pdf.
27. See id.; see also Bowman Heiden & Jens Andreasson, Reevaluating Patent
Damages in the Knowledge Economy: The Intellectual Value Chain and the Royalty Base
for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 229, 266–69 (2016).
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implementers. The cellular telecommunications market, for instance, is
composed of two critical categories of participants—handset makers and
cellular carriers—who must coordinate around innumerable
implementation details to make the market function. Standardization, in
such cases, solves coordination problems more efficiently than a series of
bilateral negotiations. It also enlarges the market on both sides by growing
the addressable consumer base through interoperability and network effects.
In addition, it reduces marginal costs by reducing the number of options that
each company must support and decreasing the contracting and
coordination costs that would accrue absent standardization. Thus,
implementers’ attraction to setting standards is easy to understand.
But standardization alone captures only a sliver of the coordination
gains that are achievable in technology–driven markets. Once the
standardization game is under way, it is not enough to merely set default
rules (like picking a side of the road to drive on). In context, the key choices
are not between two inconsequential alternatives but rather among rival
technologies, some of which are necessarily better and some of which are
necessarily worse. Certain superior technologies only work as alternatives,
not complements, to certain inferior technologies. It is therefore not enough
to simply pick a baseline and let individual firms find their way to better
implementations. Rather, the choice of technologies becomes a focal
endeavor, for there is no inherent reason for implementers to lock
themselves into offering consumers a less compelling product than what the
forefront of technology would otherwise allow. Innovation–driven
standardization also provides a form of competitive insurance by reducing
each implementer’s risk in a winner–take–all environment in which only a
few companies offer critical innovations that leave others fully in the dust,
e.g., by offering 4G LTE while other companies are only capable of offering
3G products. Behind the veil of ignorance with respect to comparative
innovation, competitors will naturally seek to reduce the catastrophic risk
of disruption by coordinating around a high baseline of innovation adoption.
At the same time, incorporating key innovations into technical standards
generates further marginal cost efficiencies with respect to marketing. As
the number of companies advertising and explaining a next–generation
technology increases, the necessary marketing expenditure per company
decreases. The credibility of the message is enhanced because it is repeated
consistently by several firms at once.
The desire to standardize innovations, however, gives rise to a series of
challenges. Most notable are the questions of how to identify and efficiently
license the innovations that should form the standard. With respect to
identifying the set of innovations for consideration, one possible solution is
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to look only to those innovations that have already resulted in issued patents,
which are necessarily disclosed in publicly available publications. That
approach proves suboptimal, however, as the most attractive innovations
are often the newest ideas, which by their nature have not been disclosed in
either issued patents or published patent applications. Implementers thus
cannot learn about such discoveries by searching for them among public
records; the information must come to them. At this point, the transaction
challenge becomes particularly acute: if an innovator discloses its as–yet–
unprotected invention, it has nothing left to sell. Alternatively,
implementers cannot buy what they do not know is for sale—a variation of
Arrow’s “paradox of information.”28 The complications do not end there.
Once a technology has been selected for incorporation into the standard, the
question becomes how rights to the technology should best be acquired.
Securing licenses to all of the necessary patents or patent applications prior
to formally promulgating the standard will entail huge transaction costs.29
The alternative of selecting the standard first and negotiating patent licenses
second, however, is no less problematic: since each patent holder holds the
right to exclude, any single patent holder may refuse to grant a license and
instead seek an injunction in order to capture monopolistic rents through a
conscious strategy of “patent holdup.”
From the implementers’ perspective, the solution is to form an
innovation marketplace—that is, a means for innovative ideas to be
presented to the implementers—thus reducing search costs, creating
information aggregation effects regarding “state of the art” technologies,
and providing access to the latest as–yet–unpatented discoveries. This, in
turn, allows implementers to specialize more heavily in implementation
instead of devoting inefficient and duplicative resources toward innovation.
Critically, these cooperative efforts create an opportunity to contract around
the risks of injunctions and patent holdup by imposing “terms of entry”
restrictions on innovators who elect to participate in that marketplace.
But innovators will have no interest in entering such a marketplace
unless they first receive assurances that they can expect a reasonable risk–
adjusted profit that exceeds their opportunity cost. Most significantly,
innovators would need assurances that, if they disclose their latest
nonpublic discoveries and waive their categorical right to exclude
unauthorized use of their inventions, they will be compensated through a
28. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 615 (1962).
29. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2661 (recognizing the high transactions costs
inherent to intellectual property).

2017]

INCENTIVES FOR “PATENT HOLDOUT”

1393

fair share of the ensuing benefits that leaves them better off than they would
be by self–commercializing their inventions and maintaining exclusionary
rights to their intellectual property. After all, once they have disclosed their
inventions to implementers and waived their categorical right to an
injunction, innovators have little leverage against the risk of widespread
infringement and the need for costly litigation—that is, “patent holdout” or
“efficient infringement.”
Yet these challenges have not proven insurmountable. To cut the
Gordian knot, innovators and implementers have worked through standards
developing organizations (“SDOs”) to develop the FRAND framework—a
contractual solution whereby implementers agree to take a license to any
standard–essential patent on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms
(“FRAND”), and to negotiate such terms in good faith. Innovators
reciprocally agree to bring their latest discoveries to the marketplace, to
notify the SDO of intellectual property rights (including patent applications)
that would be infringed by the use of such disclosed technologies, to offer
FRAND licenses for any eventual standard–essential patents (“SEPs”) in
good faith, and to forego their categorical right to exclude willing licensees
from the use of standard–essential innovations.30 Critically, innovators are
not forced or legally required to make FRAND commitments, but rather do
so willingly and voluntarily.31
The FRAND contract is thus meant to solve a host of coordination
problems between potential bilateral monopolists seeking technology–
driven standardization. Their goal is to create innovation–driven standards
that reward the efforts of each contributor. The FRAND agreement for
standards development allows the emergence of an innovation marketplace
that yields massive positive externalities, including benefits for downstream
customers.32 This win–win outcome is consistent with Robert Merges’
30. See EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS POLICY (VERSION 37) 35–36, 42–43 (2017), https://portal.etsi.org/directives/37_
directives_apr_2017.pdf (discussing “[d]isclosure of IPRs” and “availability of [l]icenses”)
[hereinafter ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy].
31. Id. at 37–38 (discussing “[n]on-availability of [l]icenses”).
32. See the ETSI’s policy objectives, which state:
It is ETSI’s objective to create STANDARDS and TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS that are based on solutions which best meet the
technical objectives of the European telecommunications sector, as
defined by the General Assembly. In order to further this objective the
ETSI IPR POLICY seeks to reduce the risk to ETSI, MEMBERS, and
others
applying
ETSI
STANDARDS
and
TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS, that investment in the preparation, adoption and
application of STANDARDS could be wasted as a result of an
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observation that “in the presence of high transaction costs, industry
participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of
IPR exchange.”33
Indeed, as demonstrated above, the FRAND agreement owes its
existence to the immutability of two significant transaction costs: the
perceived threat of the injunction remedy and the lack of public disclosure
of the most recent innovations. Because implementers fear that innovation
standardization may give rise to ex post injunctions and “patent holdup,”
they are motivated to bargain ex ante with innovators to establish voluntary
institutions that facilitate contractual solutions.34 And because innovators’
latest discoveries are not yet published in patents or patent applications,
implementers need to offer innovators some substantial consideration to
motivate them to reveal those discoveries, which can then be incorporated
into workable standards. In exchange, innovators naturally seek assurances
against “patent holdout” or “efficient infringement” by way of promises of
adequate risk–adjusted and opportunity cost–adjusted profits whenever
their inventions become standard–essential.
This mutuality of considerations has been at the heart of the voluntary
FRAND bargain from the outset, given that any risks of holdup or
misappropriation of information are bilateral—that is, such risks work in
both directions. Unfortunately, the innovation marketplace it enables
quickly unravels once the bargain is revised or reinterpreted in ways that
shortchange innovators. Thus, in 1992, the European Commission observed
that “the incentive to develop new products and processes on which to base

ESSENTIAL IPR for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION being unavailable. In achieving this objective, the
ETSI IPR POLICY seeks a balance between the needs of standardization
for public use in the field of telecommunications and the rights of the
owners of IPRs. IPR holders whether members of ETSI and their
AFFILIATES or third parties, should be adequately and fairly rewarded
for the use of their IPRs in the implementation of STANDARDS and
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
Id. at 35.
33. Merges, supra note 8, at 2655.
34. See id. (“[I]n the presence of high transaction costs, industry participants have an
incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR exchange.”); see also Robert
P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1346 (1996) (“Without . . . property
rights—backed by the threat of production-choking injunctions—the advantages conveyed
by the [patent] pool would never have been realized.”).
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future standardization will be lost if the standard-making process is carried
out without due regard for intellectual property rights.”35
The European Telecommunications Standard Institute (“ETSI”)—one
of the most active SDOs, which has been largely responsible for developing
generations of cellular telecommunications standards—has learned that
lesson the hard way. As Roger Brooks and Damien Geradin recount, ETSI’s
initial efforts at crafting an IPR Policy sought to “advance” the prior norms
by increasing restrictions on innovators through market–limiting measures
such as maximum royalty rates, “automatic licensing,” total waivers of the
injunction remedy, and mandatory arbitration.36 These efforts, however,
were met with fierce opposition and criticism from both members (some of
whom threatened to withdraw from ETSI) and other, more experienced
SDOs.37 Ultimately in 1994, ETSI abandoned its innovation–restrictive
policies and adopted a traditional FRAND policy that largely remains in
place today.38
Thus, in its current form, the ETSI IPR Policy provides that its
“objectives” are to “seek[] a balance between the needs of standardization
for public use in the field of telecommunications and the rights of the
owners of IPRs”; ETSI particularly notes that “IPR holders . . . should be
adequately and fairly rewarded for the use of their IPRs in the
implementation
of
STANDARDS
and
TECHNICAL
39
SPECIFICATIONS.”
That approach is consistent with other SDOs, like the International
Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), which has stated that its IPR policy
seeks “a working balance between the interests of SEP owners and
implementers . . . by ensuring that owners of intellectual property will be
motivated to contribute their patented technologies to the standardsdevelopment process and that the standards incorporating these
technologies will remain widely available to implementers.”40
35. COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND STANDARDIZATION 1 (1992),
http://aei.pitt.edu/1222/1/1222.pdf.
36. See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the
Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1,
17 (2011).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 21.
39. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 20, at 37.
40. Balancing Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in a Standards-Setting
Context, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (2012), https://itunews.itu.int/en/3049-Balancinginnovation-and-intellectual-property-rights-in-a-standards-setting-context.note.aspx.
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Notably, ETSI’s 1994 FRAND framework was deliberately vague,
leaving flexibility for parties to bilaterally negotiate its meaning in the
context of their particular circumstances. Since adopting its 1994 IPR
Policy, ETSI has twice rejected efforts to narrow and more tightly define
FRAND.41 The incomplete nature of the FRAND contract is therefore
neither an oversight by SDOs nor an invitation for courts to fill in the gaps
or clarify the boundaries, but rather an architectural design feature of the
FRAND framework that has been critical to its success.
Indeed, that same structural flexibility was significant to the success of
traditional forms of rate regulation rules that deal with common carriers and
public utilities, to whom the FRAND rules originally applied and who—by
virtue of their monopoly position—were long obligated to hold themselves
out to provide services to all parties on fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory terms.42 And a comparative analysis of FRAND’s
workings in that earlier context further informs a proper understanding of
the FRAND bargain with respect to standard–essential patents.
To be sure, the complications inherent in the FRAND framework were
more tractable in the earlier rate regulation context than in the patent space,
and for three reasons. The first has to do with the nature of the regulated
businesses. Common carriers and public utilities are all massive, unified
operations whose value is embodied in a few key facilities of enormous
value, such as power plants or distribution networks. The standard rate–
making procedure to deal with public utility regulations assumes that there
is no close substitute to the particular public utility, which is required to
justify investment of heavy sums in the construction of its plant before it
obtains any return from its more or less captive customer base. The large
size of the investment means that the rate calculations are performed on a
coherent set of assets and not on large, shifting portfolios of smaller assets
that comprise the whole. Second, the rate of technical change in the public
41. See Brooks & Geradin, supra note 26, at 18–21 (chronicling ETSI’s decisions in
1994 and 2006 to reject “restrictions or interpretations identical or analogous to many of
those advocated today by the proponents of the restrictive FRAND regimes,” including
automatic licensing, requiring a declaration of maximum royalty rates, and mandatory
arbitration).
42. For a general account of the problem, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488
U.S. 299 (1989). The origins of the doctrine were set out by Sir Matthew Hale in his treatise
De Portis Maribus, which noted that it was proper to impose price limitations on businesses
“affected with the public interest, or monopolies.” See Richard A. Epstein, The Reflections
and Responses of a Legal Contrarian, 44 TULSA L. REV. 647, 669 n.61 (2008). That rule
was incorporated into English law in Allnut v. Inglis in 1810. 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B.
1810). Finally, in 1876, it worked its way into American law in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1876). The term “virtual monopoly,” used in Munn to capture the difficulty of the
subject, derives from Allnut. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 669 n.61.

2017]

INCENTIVES FOR “PATENT HOLDOUT”

1397

utility and common carrier space has traditionally been relatively slow, so
it is possible to make long–term calculations with a fair degree of certainty.
And third, the rates are generally given to large classes of customers on a
take–it–or–leave it basis. Traditional rate regulation, therefore, does not
contemplate the second round of negotiation that is perfectly routine today
between the holder of a SEP and its infringers, who vary widely in size and
their individual usages of their product in question. For instance, with
certain key standards, such as those for Wi-Fi, the stakes are far larger than
they are for any physical plant, given that these key standards work
themselves into a staggeringly large set of downstream applications by large
numbers of unrelated parties. Oftentimes, the value of the SEP can be
determined only in relationship to the ultimate use that the licensee makes
of the patent in its own business.
Nonetheless, there are certain features of standard rate regulation that
do apply to FRAND negotiations over SEPs. The first of these is that rate
regulation is intended to make sure that any given monopolist does not
receive more than a competitive rate of return for the use of its products or
services. One corollary of this proposition is that the system of rate
regulation should never introduce into its rate structure cross–subsidies
among different classes of users.43 Those subsidies are not sustainable in
competitive markets because those customers who are called upon to supply
the subsidy will be able to switch easily to another supplier, thus rendering
the entire cross–subsidization project a failure. But given that there are no
close substitutes to a common carrier or public utility, the cross–subsidy
possibility is real, but also destructive. The moment that these cross
subsidies are allowed, it introduces an element of jockeying whereby
politically influential groups will seek to exert these disguised wealth
transfers in their own favor. The new arrangement thus poses the well–
known dangers of rent–seeking behavior that always arise when property
rights are made indefinite, a result which in this instance is by design.
The traditional systems of rate regulation took steps to guard against
transfer payments, such as those that might occur when the passenger
business of a railroad is taxed to subsidize its freight division,44 when the
rate of return on a regulated portion of the business is reduced because the
firm made sufficient profits from its unregulated activities,45 or when a
43. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The History of Public Utility Regulation in the
United States Supreme Court: Of Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Rates, 38 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 345 (2013).
44. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 605 (1915).
45. See, e.g., Brooks–Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of La., 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
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regulated firm is denied a guaranteed rate of return in any given period
based on the regulator’s promise to make up the shortfall in some future
period.46 These relatively hard–edged rules do not displace the higher level
of judicial deference given in ratemaking cases when there is no clear
method of accounting. For example, in the illustration above, the joint costs
that are incurred to ship both freight and passenger cars on the same train.
One danger with the common legal position that damages should be the first
remedy in patent disputes is that, in the context of multiparty deals, it
encourages the introduction of cross–subsidies through the back door.
The success of a rate–making system in dealing with these risks depends
heavily on the level of scrutiny that is given to the entire operation. The low
“rational basis” standard of constitutional law invites a level of cross–
subsidization that is not tolerated when either an intermediate–scrutiny or
strict–scrutiny standard is applied. In both these cases, the central test for
government coercion is whether it brings the overall system closer to the
competitive norm that can never be reached. But the opposite approach
arises when the legal system introduces a set of institutions that seeks to
create the very holdout problems that sound systems of rate regulation seek
to eliminate.
The most instructive example of how these negotiations can backfire
arises with mandatory collective bargaining under the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”),47 the permutations of which have governed
management–labor relations since 1935. Under the basic scheme,
management is placed under a duty to bargain in good faith with a union
that has been selected by majority vote within a designated bargaining unit,
after which the union functions as the exclusive representative of all
members of the unit, whether they voted for the union or not. Interestingly
enough, the Taft–Hartley amendments to the statute added a duty on the
union to negotiate in good faith with management in an effort to reach a
deal. The turbulent history of labor relations shows that it is difficult to
make these arrangements work in light of the high emotions that are often
on both sides of the table. Indeed, the structure condemns these bargaining
relationships to failure in ways that the FRAND negotiations are
consciously designed to avoid.
As with FRAND–-type arrangements, labor negotiations revolve
around two related axes. The first addresses the internal relations among
various union members over the division of the potential gains from
46. See, e.g., Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926).
However, this principle was disregarded in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366
(1999).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
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negotiation with management. These issues are acute because unions often
represent workers that have inherent conflicts with each other. Some
workers have seniority that others do not. A small fraction of union
members may have more skilled jobs than the majority of the members. To
deal with this question, the law imposes a duty of fair representation on the
union representative. This responsibility, however, has proven
extraordinarily difficult to enforce judicially, so that in practice these
conflicts are resolved by protracted and informal negotiations.48
The second axis concerns the pattern of negotiation between the union
and management under the good–faith umbrella that applies to both sides.
The question is what good faith means. In some contexts, it has a clear
meaning. For example, a purchaser acts in good faith when she buys
property from a party whom she thinks is the rightful owner, but who in fact
is not. The good–faith defense often protects that innocent purchaser from
a suit by the true owner to recover the property in question, leaving the
owner with only a typically futile action against the thief or converter for
damages. Closer to home, the duty of good faith in connection with
partnership arrangements requires each partner in his various business
dealings to weigh the interest of his partners equally with his own. By taking
into account all costs and benefits, the duty encourages all parties to
maximize the good of the whole. When followed uniformly by all such
partners, it leads to the highest level of output. As an offshoot of that
definition, it is commonly held that an insurance company that defends a
claim against an insured party under a policy that offers only limited
coverage is required to weigh the interest of the insured as equal to its own,
which is the only way to minimize the expected cost of the suit, taking into
account both the costs of litigation and settlement.49 In all of these cases,
the use of a good–faith standard tends to lead to an efficient resolution of
conflicts of interest between the parties.
Unfortunately, this definition is not transferable to the labor context,
where the two parties stand in a stark opposition to each other. In these
cases, the resulting bilateral monopoly situation is inferior to the results that
are obtained in a competitive market. Transaction costs are higher, the risk
of bargaining breakdown is greater, and the prospect that workers will,
through this system of negotiation, push wages above competitive levels
necessarily distorts the operation of product markets. In these adversarial
48. For the origins of this rule regarding intra-union tensions in the context of race
relations, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). For a more general
overview of a union’s duties to individual members, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967).
49. See Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Cal. App. 1973).
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circumstances, there is no way in which the duty to bargain or act in good
faith can either ensure the security of transactions or reduce conflicts of
interest, which is its role in these other contexts.
The difficulty of the good faith concept as it applies in labor law is
revealed through Section 158(d) of the NLRA, which provides:
For the purposes of this section [on the definition of unfair labor
practices], to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.50

There are several instructive points in this solution that carry over to the
FRAND obligations in the patent space. The first is that the duties to bargain
in good faith are the mutual obligation of the employer and the union,
notwithstanding the obvious asymmetry in their respective positions: the
employer represents a coherent firm, while the union represents an array of
workers with multiple and often clashing interests. The second is that
imposing mutual duties on the parties does not exactly clarify what those
duties are. The NLRA language quoted makes it clear the duty to bargain in
good faith is not a duty to make specific concessions to the opposite side.
Judicial decisions have held that this provision means what it says, even on
the question of dues check–off.51 This check–off arises when the union
wants management to deduct worker dues from their paychecks to spare the
union the serious risk of non–collection of dues from wayward employees
(some of whom may not even be union members). The refusal to follow this
no–concession rule would put the courts in the impossible position of
having to decide which party should make what concession in the event of
an impasse.
At this point, the overall system of private voluntary negotiations would
surely become unglued. Once it is clear which side is favored by the
arbitrator, the parties will then bargain in the shadow of that external
yardstick. After all, why should either party yield to any terms that are worse
than those which it can get from the all–powerful third party? Hence by a
combination of direct order and influence, the judicial decision maker will
take over an entire proceeding that it is singularly ill–suited to manage due
50. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
51. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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to innumerable workforce and business–model differences among
thousands of different union shops. Nonetheless, if the courts will not force
the parties to an agreement, it is clear under current Supreme Court law that
the employer can be required to disclose financial information on its overall
profitability in the hope that a greater common pool of information will
narrow the bargaining space and increase the likelihood of an agreement.52
In modern times, the incidence of strikes has gone down, but that change is
best explained by the increased competitiveness of the employer’s business
environment, which sets the backdrop for all labor negotiations.
The notable exception to that rule comes in breakdowns in negotiations
between unions and public employers in such sectors as transportation and
education, both service industries, in which a cessation of service is felt
immediately by a huge group of third parties whose serious economic losses
are not diminished because the legal system tends to dismiss these losses as
“incidental.” Public unions, moreover, present the additional danger that
they are on both sides of the bargaining table, given that the power of their
well-oiled political machines can drive the election of key political
officials.53 Since most of these local services are territorially based, these
unions do not have to fear new entry, and hence are in a position to drive up
their power in ways that leads, for example, to rules on job security and
pensions that pose a deep threat to the overall political system. Further, it is
hard to undo these changes since these pension benefits typically vest as of
the time of employment, and thus for current employees cannot be cut back
even for future payments under current contracts.54 The good faith
obligations for negotiation in this context do little to prevent the breakdown
of labor markets for public employees. The situation is quite different in
the private sector. The decline of tariff barriers and the deregulation of many
key sectors, like telecommunications, reduces the potential for monopoly
gains, and therefore undercuts the power that a union could enjoy when
pitted against an employer that is a sole supplier in a larger marketplace.

52. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
53. The matter is now coming to a head before the United States Supreme Court in
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 32,
which remains pending at the time of this writing. See Amy Howe, Argument Preview: For
the Third Time, Justices Take on Union-Fee Issue, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 20, 2018, 10:30
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/02/argument-preview-third-time-justices-takeunion-fee-issue/.
54. The key case is Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1947). For an
exhaustive discussion, see Amy Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule”
and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029 (2012).
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For these purposes, the key question is why the good–faith negotiations
that are undertaken in the context of FRAND do not exhibit the pathologies
that the good–faith obligations cannot effectively control in the context of
labor relationships. The relevant features of SDOs help supply an
explanation that covers the broad range of cases.55 The initial point is that
labor negotiations under the NLRA are negative sum games in which any
bargain that ultimately emerges is going to be less efficient than the
competitive solution in which firms are allowed, at low cost, to make
workers take–it–or–leave it offers. These offers in competitive markets will
have to be high enough to attract workers, but low enough to permit firms
to sell their own goods and services to their customer base. The FRAND
negotiations will not be as efficient as the competitive labor markets, but
they do share this characteristic. Indeed, FRAND negotiations are positive
sum. The parties are not put together by judicial fiat. Instead, each party that
enters into these negotiations hopes to help set a standard that will improve
the economic prospects of all the firms involved by allowing them to
cooperate with each other by designing a better product leading to a larger
market for all participants’ inputs.
The success of these negotiations therefore depends on the ability to
elicit cooperation from all members. One way that this is done is to separate
the standard development process from the competitive process that will
take place once the standards have been put in place. Accordingly, the
standard development operation is handled by engineers and other technical
experts who are separated from the business arms of their various firms.
That separation is enforced because the standard chosen is not set with
respect to any given patent. Rather, the standard is first chosen on technical
grounds, albeit with the assurance that known essential patents will be
available for license on FRAND terms. Only later is it decided which
patents read onto the standard that has been selected. It is thus common that
a standard championed by representatives of firm A will require the
incorporation of technology patented by firm B, or a set of processes that
have yet to be reduced to patents by anyone. In effect, these negotiations are
conducted, as it were, behind a veil of ignorance in which the many
participants will best advance their own interests if the organization sets a
standard preferred by the greatest number of members. Indeed, it is common
in many SDOs for the representatives of the end users to participate in the
discussion about standards even if they are not in a position to vote on what
standard is set. Their simple presence in the room is an added check against
various forms of opportunism, for their voice in these deliberations has a
55. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP and SSOs: Government Hold-Up
Replacement Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 8–15 (2012).
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key role in determining how the particular vote on any standard comes out.
In addition, there is generally an obligation to disclose any patent that a firm
has that reads onto a standard, so the potential conflict of interest is further
limited. Unlike the labor situation, the parties know that they do not enjoy
any monopoly position because the selection of any given standard does not
guarantee that some rival standard will not emerge to deal with the same
problem; all the parties therefore are aware that any unilateral effort to
degrade the standard for partisan advantage could result in the inability of
the inferior standard to hold its own in the marketplace. Hence, the strong
insistence by SDOs to avoid the holdup or bargaining problems which are,
by contrast, routine in collective bargaining between management and
labor.56
In sum, as the above discussion has demonstrated, the FRAND bargain,
in the context of innovation–driven standardization, is a voluntary
reciprocal exchange of assurances that is central to the formation and
continuing operation of a vibrant marketplace between innovators and
implementers that generates enormous positive externalities. That the
nature of the exchange is somewhat indefinite and vague is not an invitation
for judicial intervention or interpretation, but a central and necessary feature
of the framework itself. It is therefore critical to warn against hasty
interventions in the rare, marginal cases that have the potential to disrupt
the delicate balance of rights and obligations that lead to successful
negotiated outcomes in the huge number of routine cases. What is
necessary, rather, is an appreciation of the inherent reciprocity of the good–
faith foundations of the FRAND exchange, as well as the ability of both
sides to respond to violations of the good faith covenant on one side with
reciprocal defections on the other side, such that an implementer can predict
56. Request for Comments and Announcement of Workshop on Standard Setting
Issues, 76 FR 28036 (May 13, 2011) (the “Request”) - Patent Standards Workshop, Project
No. P11-1204, ALL. FOR TELECOMM. INDUS. SOLUTIONS 1 (June 14, 2011), (“ATIS has
not experienced the hold up problem . . . .”), www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_comments/request-comments-and-announcement-workshop-standardsetting-issues-project-no.p111204-00015%C2%A0/00015-60529.pdf; Re: Federal Trade
Commission Request for Comments and Announcement of Workshop on Standards-Setting
Issues (Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. P11-1204), INT’L COMM. FOR INFO. TECH.
STANDARDS 1 (June 20, 2011), https://goo.gl/43MuNC (“The current officers and staff
have not been notified of any active patent ‘hold-up’ problems with regards to INCITS
standards.”); Re: Federal Trade Commission Request for Comments and Announcement of
Workshop on Standard-Setting Issues (Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. P111204), TELECOMMS. INDUS. ASSOC. 4 (June 14, 2011), https://goo.gl/YcNo6V (“TIA has
never received any complaints regarding such ‘patent hold-up’ and does not agree that
‘patent hold-up’ is plaguing the information and telecommunications technology (ICT)
standard development processes.”).
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that a failure to bargain in good faith on its end will trigger a corresponding
request for an injunction by the innovator on the other. As the next Part
explains, only the threat of escalating harms from defection can generate
the equilibrium outcome in which both sides uphold their good–faith
obligations.
III.

ENFORCING FRAND: BALANCING STRONG PROPERTY
RIGHTS WITH LIABILITY RULES

As the previous discussion demonstrated, a central feature of the
FRAND bargain is to provide implementers access to licenses for patents
covering standardized innovations (i.e., SEPs) that implementers must
necessarily infringe when practicing the relevant standard.57 Thus, having
voluntarily entered the FRAND contract, a patent holder waives its right to
categorically refuse to grant a license, as well as its right to seek an
injunction against an implementer without first attempting to engage in
good faith negotiations in pursuit of a license on FRAND terms. The
question arises, however, whether the injunction remedy should remain
available to the innovator under any circumstance, most notably when an
implementer refuses to engage in good–faith negotiations on FRAND
terms. After all, that quid pro quo is at the heart of the FRAND deal ex ante.
Indeed, absent the backstop of the injunction threat, implementers will have
powerful incentives to breach their end of the FRAND contract and pursue
their own ex post strategy of “patent holdout” or “efficient infringement.”
That conduct could lead to suboptimal returns from playing the FRAND
game, and thus an eventual breakdown of the FRAND–enabled innovation
marketplace.58
57. See, e.g., the ETSI’s policy objectives, which state:
In order to further this objective the ETSI IPR POLICY seeks to reduce
the risk to ETSI, MEMBERS, and others applying ETSI STANDARDS
and TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, that investment in the
preparation, adoption and application of STANDARDS could be wasted
as a result of an ESSENTIAL IPR for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION being unavailable.
ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 20, at 35.
58. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Business Models and the Standard Setting Process,
in THE PROS AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING 34, 49 (2010). Layne-Farrar states:
[O]nce upstream patent holders have no option of seeking injunctive
relief, they will have no bargaining power at all in licensing negotiations.
Especially within standard setting contexts, where the parties typically
commit t-o license via a FRAND promise, such a rule would amount to
compulsory licensing, leaving up-stream patent holders at the mercy of
licensees.
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Indeed, the fashionable “efficient infringement” term is itself a sign of
the weakness of the common position, for it evokes the oft–used contract
notion of “efficient breach” by which it is said that each and every promise
should be regarded as an option by the promisor to either perform or pay
damages.59 Under this view, injunctions against doing business with third
persons should always be off the table. But the objections to the theory of
efficient breach are numerous.60 The most obvious is that oftentimes the
calculation of damages is sufficiently complex that important items are too
difficult to evaluate. This means promisees are thus left systematically
undercompensated. In addition, in dealing with complex supply chains,
nonperformance of one contract has ripple effects down the supply chain as
more and more people are dislocated. In these downstream disputes, it is
not clear whether the promisor who has not performed has a defense based
on its inability to obtain the necessary inputs for its performance from his
promisors. In all supply chain operations, the focus is on making sure that
performance levels are high through the entire system. On this view of the
world, any deliberate breach of contract, made in order to secure a high
price from another customer, is a fatal offense. The use of damages becomes
acceptable only as a backstop remedy, chiefly in cases where timely
performance is rendered impossible, say because of a seller’s accidental
destruction of the goods made for sale.
In patent law as in ordinary contract law, the goal is performance, not
damages. Efficient infringement, like efficient breach, is a dangerous
misnomer. In response to the risks of efficient infringement, the parties
develop institutional arrangements to overcome all obstacles to high–levels
of performance.
Yet an influential body of literature, led by Mark Lemley and Carl
Shapiro, has instead focused primarily on the risk of “patent holdup” by
59. An early version of this thesis is found in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s The
Common Law, which stated: “[T]he only universal consequence of a legally binding
promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not
come to pass.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881). Holmes
was aware that in some cases the other remedies are allowable but regarded those only as
exceptional. Id. at 300–01. For a later version see, for example, Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes
on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM L. REV. 554 (1977).
For critiques, see Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1.
(1989), and Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
60. For discussion, see generally Richard A. Epstein & David Kappos, Legal
Remedies for Patent Infringement: From General Principles to FRAND Obligations for
Standard Essential Patents, 9 COMPETITION POLICY INT’L 69 (2013).
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innovators while paying short shrift to the correlative risk of “patent
holdout” by implementers.61 While their more recent work has passingly
acknowledged the possibility that the injunctive threat may prod
implementers into good–faith FRAND licensing negotiations,62 the
principal focus of Lemley and Shapiro’s work has been to discourage the
availability of injunctions in the context of products that practice multiple
patents, such as mobile handsets that practice numerous SEPs.63 Lemley and
Shapiro advise courts to deny injunctions “when the product that would be
enjoined contains multiple components, of which only one is the subject of
the patent in suit”—a factual description that applies to nearly every product
in the modern marketplace, including many pharmaceutical products.64 That
“relatively simple step,” according to Lemley and Shapiro, “will help to
rebalance the patent system and ensure that it enhances rather than impedes
innovation in component industries.”65
Lemley and Shapiro’s writings should be read against the backdrop of
the Supreme Court’s then–recent decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C,66 in which the Supreme Court reversed the traditional rule that a
patentee is presumptively entitled to some form of injunctive relief for
infringement of a valid patent. In its stead, the Court adopted a now familiar
four–part test:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity

61. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (2012) (conflating the risk of patent holdout
with explicit “copying” and observing that copying “isn’t much of a problem”); Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach To Setting Reasonable Royalties for StandardEssential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1135, 1144 n.23 (2013) (observing that courts
may rightly find it inappropriate to grant injunctions even against unwilling FRAND
licensees); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1991–92; Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, HoldUp, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280, 280–82 (2010).
62. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 1144 n.23, 1153 (acknowledging that the
injunction remedy should be available to innovators faced with an implementer who
refuses to negotiate a FRAND license in good faith).
63. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2036.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2045.
66. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.67

This “well-established” test mentioned in eBay bears little relationship
to the historical practices that courts, particularly courts of equity, applied
in ordinary nuisance cases.68 In these situations, the difficulty of calculating
present and future damages attributable to ongoing activities persuaded
courts that the first line of defense should be the injunction, which could
then be, and often was, supplemented by various forms of interim and
cleanup damages. The eBay decision jettisoned that subtle and flexible
mixed remedial approach and instead reverted to a stark and simplistic
opposition between “property rules” and “liability rules,” as those terms
were used by Calabresi and Melamed in their seminal article on the
subject,69 which only considered the pure form of both types of remedy.
That mistake magnified the errors of both kinds of rules,70 as error and
implementation costs always increase in exponential fashion as the law
moves to either corner. The holdout problem created under an injunction–
only regime has far greater disruptive power than it does in a world in which
a small payment of damages may relax some particularly onerous terms of
the categorical injunction. And the risk of abuse can be reduced still further
by attaching various conditions and limitations to injunctive relief that were
not the focus of the Calabresi and Melamed article. Conversely, the
valuation problems of a damage system are reduced if the injunction is able
to reduce the extent and uncertainty of the loss.
The misunderstanding of the remedial permutations used in standard
nuisance cases are only magnified when the battleground shifts from
ordinary nuisance disputes to patent litigation. Even in the two–party cases,
the great defect of the damages–first approach is that it gives the potential
infringer every incentive to refuse to negotiate, knowing that the patent
holder will have to endure expensive litigation to obtain damages down the
road at a time when either the holder, the infringer, or both may be insolvent.
The patentee’s situation is further compromised because imitation is the
most serious form of flattery. Any firm that is normally willing to purchase
a license from a patentee may well refuse to do so if noncompliant firms
gain a competitive advantage over compliant firms. Therefore, it becomes
67. Id. at 391.
68. See generally Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution?
The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012) (reviewing traditional
equitable remedies, which shows the dominance of injunctive relief, contrary to eBay’s
four-part test).
69. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5.
70. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property and the Law of
Contract: The Case Against “Efficient Breach”, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 345 (2013).
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exceedingly dangerous to adopt remedial structures that presuppose that one
side, the putative licensee, necessarily acts in good faith regardless of its
behavior, while the other side, the putative licensor, does not. The use of
the injunction, suitably restrained in cases of bad faith assertion by the
patentee, is an essential component of an overall systematic strategy
designed to prevent the disintegration of the voluntary market. A tool that
is essential in simple two–party patent disputes does not lose its appeal in
the context of SEPs.
The flawed remedial structure announced in eBay is further aggravated
in the interpretation and enforcement of patent remedies in multiparty
situations, most notably in connection with SEPs that are licensed under
FRAND principles. The transaction costs in this context are even higher
than in the ordinary patent context, and the correct allocation of rights and
default rules is thus even more critical.71 “Correct” rules are those that (i)
move the parties toward the Pareto–optimal outcome they would otherwise
reach through negotiation in the absence of transaction costs, (ii) adopt
practices that reduce transaction costs in order to promote negotiated
solutions over litigation, and (iii) uphold and enforce the results of parties’
preexisting contractual solutions. “Incorrect” rules create the opposite
effects, and their distortionary impacts are difficult to bargain around
precisely because of high uncertainty and high transaction costs.
In the FRAND context, a mixed remedial system that begins with the
presumption of an injunction in cases of refusals to deal and bad faith
negotiations by the putative licensee is the correct approach in that it serves
each of the above objectives. It is the very threat of the injunction right—
and its associated high transaction costs—that brings the parties to the
negotiating table and motivates them to draw upon the full scope of their
knowledge and creativity in forming contractual and institutional solutions
to the perceived holdup problem.72 Indeed the FRAND architecture—and
all of its attendant benefits and positive externalities—has arisen because of
the presumption of injunctive relief, not despite it.
Patent pools for standard–essential patents present another important
illustration of the merits of an injunction–first remedial approach. These
71. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For the
enduring viability of this notion, see also Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1663 n.9 (1989) (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 38, 46–47, 68–69, 81, 82–83, 90, 93–94, 104, 113–14, 122–23 (3d ed. 1986));
Merges, supra note 8, at 2655–62.
72. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2655 (“[I]n the presence of high transaction costs,
industry participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR
exchange.”).
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pools do not form before the standard is selected, largely because at that
juncture no one knows the standard, and thus cannot determine which
patents read onto the standards and which do not. Indeed, any effort to
bargain for inclusion of a predetermined portfolio of patents before the
deliberations are concluded makes it much more likely that an inferior
standard will be selected. “The actual creation of pools typically occurs late
in the standard life cycle.”73
At this juncture, the standard tends to reduce transaction costs in two
ways. First, it makes it easier for various firms that hold patents that read
onto the standard to negotiate with each other. Oftentimes, a two–stage
negotiation works better than a single negotiation with a large number of
parties. Thus, if twenty–four persons hold patents that read onto the
standard, it could be easier to find solutions if some separate pools, not
necessarily of equal size or value, are created. Some patents may be in
groups of six, others in groups of four. Indeed, there is nothing about this
process that requires that all patents be placed into pools once the standard
is set. It could well be that parties that hold especially strong patents will
prefer to negotiate separately. When patents are placed into pools, there is
always the risk that the agreement among pool members on royalty rates
will include, often by error, implicit cross subsidies. But that risk is in turn
reduced if all the patents appear at the ex ante stage to have roughly equal
value, which makes the first level of bargaining more efficient.
The use of these pools thus increases the returns on investment of all
patent holders from the ex ante perspective.74 They also make it easier to
allow for cross–licensing among multiple patent owners in ways that reduce
the potential of infringement suits that exist when a given portion of the
patent terrain is covered by multiple patents. Just as having small plots of
real estate in separate hands increases the likelihood of trespass, so too
holding patents of small terrain does the same in the IP space. The pooling
solutions thus provide benefits not only in dealing with the outside world,
but in dealing with other FRAND members, and the negotiations in these
cases can then serve as useful benchmarks for the negotiations with external
parties.
Even holders of patents that ultimately do not read onto standards are
left better off ex ante, given that the anticipated returns from success are
higher with a viable pooling option available after the standard is set. And
73. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, The Effect of Patent Pools on Patenting and
Innovation—Evidence from Contemporary Patent Standards 12 (Feb. 2, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter
/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_effect_of_patents.pdf.
74. Id.
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in many cases, firms may come with portfolios of patents, some of which
read onto a particular standard even if others do not. Accordingly, some
measure of diversification reduces the size of the downside. Hence, the
expectation is that patent pools should increase returns to the members of
the pool. The logic runs as follows: once one part of the standard is clarified,
non–pool parties know that their negotiation costs will be reduced because
they need to deal with fewer parties in a less complex legal environment.
The conflicts of interest which typically crop up in labor–management
negotiations are thus muted because of the very different bargaining
structures, which are, at all stages, calculated to achieve maximum gain.
The formation of these pools also has its impact on the second stage of
negotiations, which occurs between holders of patents subject to FRAND
obligations and outside parties. The standard in this context is, of course,
necessarily vague when it is stated in the abstract, but the high rate at which
these negotiations have historically concluded suggests that this vagueness
leads to fewer breakdowns than one might expect a priori. One reason is
that the formation of pools will reduce the number of separate negotiations
that take place. Another is that these negotiations all take place in a
fishbowl, meaning that an intransigent stand by any one holder of a SEP
will place pressure not only on the prospective licensees but also on those
FRAND licensors for the same standard who hold the complementary
patents whose value will be reduced if any inefficiencies in the final
standard lead to its rejection in the marketplace. In addition, it is likely that
there is some overlap between the group of innovators and implementers,
for some technology players will hold dual roles of licensor and licensee.
This close interdependence extends not only to any single pool but also to
other similar pools, creating an environment in which repeat players have
to weigh the loss of future opportunities against the possible gains of an
aggressive stance in the immediate transaction.
All of these soft pressures typically push parties to make deals so that
the FRAND patents do not sit idle while the underlying negotiations take
place. These pressures tend to speed up the process of coordination. The
effort to impose various independent substantive rules on the operation of
this process is highly costly because it involves the examination of the rate
of patent utilization in alternative states of the world which are both
unobservable and difficult to infer from existing practices. Words like
“reasonable royalties” and “incremental damages” may roll easily off the
page in government reports, such as the 2011 FTC report entitled “The
Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with
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Competition,”75 where it is sometimes stated that sound practice requires,
“when it can be determined, [for] the incremental value of the patented
invention over the next-best alternative [to] establish[] the maximum
amount that a willing licensee would pay in a hypothetical negotiation,” and
for “[c]ourts [to] not award reasonable royalty damages higher than this
amount.”76 But it is never clear which the next best alternative is when there
are two or more, or how that reasonable royalty rate should be determined.77
Note that the voluntary practice, when goaded by the injunction, does not
need any independent body to both define and apply these slippery
definitions in complex cases. It is also worth noting that the administrative
costs needed to work out either of these rates will necessarily result in the
decline in value of all standards going forward; after all, once the law
imposes any external standard, the parties will perforce bargain to that
background norm, even if it conflicts with prior industry norms and
practices, which may of course vary from industry to industry. Calculating
marginal benefits and costs is extraordinarily difficult, and often
unnecessary given that parties need not know what these are.
The courts neither have the information nor the institutional capacity of
replicating, much less improving upon, contractual and institutional
arrangements such as FRAND and SEP patent pools, which have arisen
because of the presumption of injunctive relief.78 Thus, at least in the SEPs
context, it would seem logical for the courts to push the parties toward
negotiated and coordinated solutions through a strong recognition of
property rights backed by a principled preference for injunction relief.
That is particularly true given that the theoretical boogeyman of “royalty
stacking”—a principal justification for subverting injunctive relief—has
been empirically debunked. In industries subject to innovation–driven
standardization, such as mobile handsets, the consistent evidence points to
a combination of sharp price decreases and massive technological progress,
as well as low aggregate patent royalty payments and increasing market
penetration.79 The notion that implementers in such innovation–driven
industries are being suffocated by an insurmountable patent royalty stack
has turned out to be nothing more than horror fiction. This reality is perhaps
75. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 147 (2011).
76. Id. at 189.
77. For a longer critique of the 2011 report, see Epstein et al., supra note 43.
78. See Merges, supra note 24, at 1346 (“Without property rights—backed by the
threat of production-choking injunctions—the advantages conveyed by the [patent] pool[s]
would never have been realized.”).
79. See supra note 17.
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best demonstrated by the fact that Google has chosen to enter the mobile
handset business,80 and Nokia has also elected to reenter that business after
several years of seeking to monetize its innovations exclusively through
FRAND licensing agreements.81 If the FRAND licensing business were as
lucrative as stacking theory predicts, Nokia would have remained a patent
licensing company, rather than reentering the product space. And, if royalty
stacking were true, an entity as sophisticated (and opportunity–rich) as
Google would not have waded into making and selling mobile handsets. 82
Yet as the following Part describes, courts in the United States have
largely taken the opposite approach by defaulting to liability rules without
due regard for property rights, even in the face of evidence of patent holdout
by implementers,83 which is facilitated by misinterpreting and thus
redefining FRAND as a wholly one–sided agreement that only serves
implementers’ interests. These efforts have yielded “incorrect” results in
that they have not moved the parties toward the Pareto–optimal outcome
they would achieve absent transaction costs, upheld the results of their
contractual agreements, or incented them toward negotiated solutions.
Instead, they have merely encouraged even greater litigation.
IV.

THE EROSION OF THE FRAND FRAMEWORK IN
RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND SDO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY
REVISIONS

As noted in Part II, the FRAND framework is deliberately vague in
order to provide critical flexibility for parties to shape its contours to the
80. Tim Higgins & Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Google Announces New Pixel
Smartphones, Amazon Echo Rival, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2016, 9:23 AM), www.wsj.com/
articles/google-to-detail-amazon-echo-fighter-called-home-new-phones-1475592365.
81. Rory Cellan-Jones, Nokia Dials Back Time to Sell Mobile Phones Again, BBC
(Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38167451.
82. Of course, Google may see profit opportunities in the handset space that go
beyond per unit profits from device sales. But it is ultimately irrelevant how Google expects
to capture value from entering the mobile handset market. The point is simply that Google’s
decision to enter the market necessarily reveals that Google sees a significant opportunity
for large supra-competitive profits. That fact directly contradicts the gloomy prediction of
royalty-stacking theory that aggregate patent royalties will cause firms to “not find it worth
incurring the costs necessary to develop, manufacture, and sell” products like mobile
handsets. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 2012.
83. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2662 (observing that a strong property rights rule for
patents facilitates contractual solutions to patents’ high transaction costs, whereas liability
rules “work against the flexible, voluntary institutions that are formed to overcome the
costs faced by transactors”).
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particular circumstances of their negotiations. Notwithstanding its virtues,
that amorphousness will, from time to time, bring the parties to litigation.84
In response, courts have too often ignored the contractual and mutual
exchange that underlies the FRAND bargain, as well as the criticality of
enforcing the obligation of good faith and fair dealing on both sides. In its
place they have instead attempted to “clarify” FRAND itself, beginning
with the false premise that FRAND was principally created to promote
“widespread” standardization and to avoid “patent holdup,” i.e., that
FRAND was created for the benefit of implementers alone and should thus
be interpreted with a presumptive preference toward those interests.85
Working from this incorrect premise, courts have largely ignored the
injunctive remedy even in the face of evidence that the implementer refused
to negotiate at all, or at least in good faith, and have also concluded that
innovators should take no share of the commercial benefits accruing from
standardization of their innovations.
As we illustrate in this Part, the choice between the two strategies—a
principal preference for liability rules or a mixed approach that begins with
the injunction remedy—is not just a zero–sum game. Indeed, in the face of
high transaction costs, pure liability rules tend both to encourage “patent
holdout” by implementers and to shortchange innovators in ex post
allocations of the cooperative surplus created by FRAND negotiations.
Taken together, these two forces reduce the rate of return to innovation
overall and to FRAND commitments in particular. Innovators are acutely
responsive to such incentive changes in this context, and ex post
devaluations of their returns from the FRAND game in a given round
necessarily have feedback effects on their willingness to participate in
subsequent rounds. In practice, they might then refuse to license their
innovations to the industry as a whole, preferring to develop them internally
or form limited strategic innovation–development partnerships with only a
select set of industry participants. And if neither of the former alternatives

84. See, e.g., Microsoft v. Motorola, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (W.D. Wash. April
25, 2013); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL
5593609, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Apple v. Motorola, 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. (“CSIRO”) v. Cisco Sys., 809 F.3d 1295,
1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015).
85. See, e.g., Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (“The purpose of the RAND
commitment is to encourage widespread adoption of the standard.”); id. at *20 (“In trying
to reach an agreement, the SEP owner would have been obligated to license its SEPs on
RAND terms which necessarily must abide by the purpose of the RAND commitment of
widespread adoption of the standard through avoidance of holdup and stacking.”).
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is appealing, they might instead reduce their research and development
allocations across the board. Moreover, if these same parties function as
innovators in different markets, they should get the benefit of the robust
protection of FRAND–committed patents advanced by the rule defended in
this essay: the willingness to participate in a FRAND regime should not
foreclose the issuance of an injunction against parties that seek to avoid the
negotiation process, i.e., unwilling licensees.
The decisions of the Federal Circuit in Apple v. Motorola86 and the
Ninth Circuit in Microsoft v. Motorola87 are illustrative of the prevailing
hostility toward injunctions in the FRAND context—even where there is
evidence of an unwilling licensee—and the dangers of that bias.
In Apple v. Motorola, Motorola had sought an injunction on the grounds
that Apple had negotiated in bad faith by refusing Motorola’s licensing
offers, which Motorola contended were on FRAND terms, and by stalling
negotiations.88 Judge Richard Posner, sitting by designation on the district
court, denied that request on summary judgment.89 On appeal, a majority of
the Federal Circuit panel applied the four–part balancing test set forth in
eBay, holding that the combination of Motorola’s FRAND commitment and
its willingness to license its patent effectively foreclosed a finding of either
irreparable harm or that monetary damages alone would be inadequate.90
And while the majority opinion, authored by Judge Jimmie Reyna,
nominally acknowledged that “an injunction may be justified where an
infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays
negotiations to the same effect,” it nonetheless concluded that Apple should
not be enjoined because “negotiations have been ongoing, and there is no
evidence that Apple has been, for example, unilaterally refusing to agree to
a deal.”91
The inconsistency between the court’s legal statement and its holding
was not lost on Judge Randall Rader, who wrote separately to concur and
dissent in part. He concurred that a unilateral refusal to take a FRAND
license should trigger an injunction. But he dissented from the majority’s
affirmance of the denial of Motorola’s injunction request. Judge Rader
instead found “evidence that Apple may have been a holdout” and criticized
the majority’s unwillingness to analyze whether Apple’s refusal to license
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1332.
Id.
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on Motorola’s offered terms was a refusal of a “FRAND royalty.” 92 He
further cited evidence that Apple had refused for years to even discuss a
license while nonetheless infringing the patent in suit.93
Judge Sharon Prost, on the other hand, also wrote separately to express
the opposite opinion. While she agreed with the majority opinion that
Motorola did not qualify for an injunction, she disagreed with both Judge
Reyna and Judge Rader “that an alleged infringer’s refusal to enter into a
licensing agreement justifies entering an injunction against its conduct.”94
Instead, she took the view that an implementer’s negotiation conduct—no
matter how intransigent—should never justify granting an injunction to the
holder of the SEP.95
These fractured views appear to explain the internal inconsistency
between the statement of the law in Apple and its holding. Yet whatever the
reasons, the ensuing decision appears to stand for the troubling proposition
that a proven infringer of FRAND–encumbered patents may avoid an
injunction so long as it maintains the semblance of ongoing negotiations,
regardless of whether it has refused to accept FRAND licensing terms.
Stated otherwise, Apple conflates a unilateral refusal to accept a FRAND
deal (which is the relevant inquiry) with a unilateral refusal to engage in
discussions regarding any deal (which is a toothless standard).
By suggesting that an implementer acts in good faith by simply
maintaining a negotiation dialogue, without also considering whether the
implementer has refused to accept a proper FRAND licensing offer, the
Apple majority opinion encourages two erroneous outcomes. First, it
suggests that innovators should continue to negotiate even after they have
offered a license on FRAND terms, thus necessarily eroding their
bargaining power and the value of FRAND–encumbered patents. Second,
it suggests that an injunction may not be available unless an implementer
refuses to engage in any licensing discussions at all, even if it has rejected
FRAND terms, magnifying the same effect.
Subsequently, in Microsoft v. Motorola, the Ninth Circuit made a
similar error. The case arose out of two letters in which Motorola made
opening offers to license its standard–essential patents covering certain WiFi and video encoding standards at a rate of 2.25% of the sales price of the
end products—offers that Motorola represented were consistent with its

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1332–34 (Rader, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1333–34 (Rader, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1342–43 (Prost, J., dissenting in part).
Id.
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FRAND obligations.96 The letters stated the offers were available for twenty
days. Microsoft did not make a counteroffer or engage in any negotiations.
Instead, before the end of that twenty–day period, Microsoft sued Motorola,
asserting Motorola’s initial offer was a breach of its FRAND
commitments.97 The next day, Motorola responded with a countersuit
seeking an injunction from the district court, and also filed for an injunction
with the International Trade Commission (“ITC”).98 Microsoft, in turn,
amended its complaint to assert that Motorola had further breached its
FRAND commitments by pursuing injunctions.99
The district court set out to determine a FRAND range for the Motorola
portfolios in order to determine whether Motorola’s opening licensing offer
was a breach of its FRAND commitment. In a 207–page opinion, the court
concluded that the top end of the FRAND range was approximately 16 cents
per unit for the video encoding portfolio and 19 cents per unit for the Wi-Fi
portfolio—figures that were notably lower than Motorola’s opening
offer.100 Those rates were then presented to a jury, which was asked whether
Motorola violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing by seeking an
injunction. The jury found against Motorola and awarded Microsoft
damages that included the attorneys’ fees Microsoft incurred in defending
the injunction actions.101
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying that verdict. The appellate court accepted the jury’s finding that
Motorola had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by pursuing
injunctions, citing four categories of evidence.102 Notably, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that because Motorola could have ultimately obtained a FRAND
award from the district court, it lacked a legitimate fear of irreparable harm.
From there, the appellate court made the leap that, “[i]n the absence of a
fear of irreparable harm as a motive for seeking an injunction, the jury could
have inferred that the real motivation was to induce Microsoft to agree to a
license at a higher-than-[F]RAND rate.”103 In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
embraced the theory that a FRAND–encumbered patentee may violate its
duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach its FRAND commitment by
seeking injunctive relief, at least where it has not first offered a license on
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1046.
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FRAND terms.104 With respect to damages, the Ninth Circuit held that
Microsoft was entitled to the attorneys’ fees it incurred in defending against
the injunctions because such fees were “consequential contract damages”
arising out of Motorola’s breach of its FRAND obligations.105
In a similar vein, in March 2015 the IEEE adopted a set of IPR policy
revisions in which it stated that a FRAND commitment to the IEEE
“precludes seeking, or seeking to enforce” an injunction except in two
narrow circumstances: (1) where “the implementer fails to participate in, or
to comply with the outcome of, an adjudication, including an affirming firstlevel appellate review,” or (2) “[i]n jurisdictions where the failure to request
a Prohibitive Order in a pleading waives the right to seek a Prohibitive Order
at a later time.”106 Notably, the IEEE’s policy does not even permit
patentees to pursue an injunction where an implementer has categorically
refused to take a license on FRAND terms or to negotiate in good faith, and
is thus even more restrictive than Apple and Microsoft.
The critical flaw with the combined result of the Ninth Circuit and
Federal Circuit decisions (and the IEEE’s policy revision) is that it gives
implementers a “heads I win, tails you lose” litigation alternative to
pursuing good–faith negotiations, with the dual negative effects of
categorically lowering the value of FRAND–encumbered patents and
discouraging negotiated resolutions. Recall that in Microsoft, the dispute
arose out of Motorola’s opening offer, to which Microsoft only responded
by immediately filing a lawsuit—an approach the district court and Ninth
Circuit ultimately embraced and rewarded. Motorola’s injunction request
only came after Microsoft’s lawsuit and was not the genesis of the parties’
litigation proceedings. Yet the Ninth Circuit held that an innovator’s
opening offer in a FRAND negotiation is subject to such a stringent duty of
good faith that an innovator may not seek injunctive relief even where an
implementer refuses to make any good faith counteroffer in the
negotiations.
Thus, under Microsoft, an implementer of FRAND–encumbered SEPs
has numerous motivations and few disincentives to respond to an opening
licensing offer with a lawsuit. If the innovator’s opening offer is later
determined to have been FRAND, the implementer can accept the offer at
104. Id. at 1048–49, n.19 (citing Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F.
Supp. 2d 998, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2013), for the proposition that seeking injunctive relief
“before offering a license on [F]RAND terms” is inherently inconsistent with the FRAND
commitment) (emphasis added).
105. Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
106. IEEE, supra note 10, § 6.2 at 16–18.
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that time, several years down the road. While the implementer would be
aware of the nominal risk of an injunction under such facts, 107 it would be
willing to take that risk since, under Microsoft and Apple, mere participation
in court–ordered mediation sessions and a post–litigation agreement to pay
the judicially determined FRAND rate would appear to obviate both
“irreparable harm” and bad faith, and thus the ability to obtain an
injunction.108 If, on the other hand, the opening offer is later determined to
have been above FRAND, the implementer will pay the lower FRAND rate
and may also obtain its attorneys’ fees if, for instance, the opening offer is
deemed to have erred from FRAND beyond the zone of good faith. Either
way, by filing suit the implementer will also force the innovator to incur
many millions of dollars in litigation costs, the value of which will not be
reflected in the court’s FRAND determination.109
Innovators, in turn, must take these realities into account in making their
opening offers. Under the specter of Microsoft, the correct opening offer is
no longer one that positions the parties to conclude a license on FRAND
terms, but rather one that is likely to be FRAND from the outset. Perhaps
the implementer will make a counteroffer, but under prevailing law that
offer will not be tested against the same good faith standard that is applied
to innovators. Hence, availing itself of that option is likely to only generate
further delay, which could work to the implementer’s advantage. If the
innovator rejects, the implementer can sue and, at worst, can later accept the
innovator’s initial offer. Meanwhile, the implementer can argue that any
untested counteroffer conclusively demonstrates good faith under Apple.
107. See Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1048, n.19 (agreeing with the Federal Circuit in Apple
that “if an infringer refused to accept an offer on [F]RAND terms, seeking injunctive relief
could be consistent with the [F]RAND agreement, even where the commitment limits
recourse to litigation”).
108. See id. at 1046 (holding that Microsoft’s payment of a judicially determined
FRAND rate would have “fully compensated for Microsoft’s infringing use” and that the
potential availability of such an award precluded the possibility of irreparable harm). Apple
v. Motorola also states:
Motorola’s FRAND commitments . . . strongly suggest that money
damages are adequate to compensate Motorola for any infringement.
Similarly, Motorola has not demonstrated that Apple’s infringement
caused it irreparable harm. . . . Motorola argues that Apple has refused
to accept its initial licensing offer and stalled negotiations. However, the
record reflects that negotiations are ongoing, and there is no evidence
Apple has been, for example, unilaterally refusing to agree to a deal.
757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
109. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting in part) (“In the absence of the
threat of an injunction, an infringer would have no incentive to negotiate a license because
the worst-case scenario from a patent infringement lawsuit is that it would have to pay the
same amount it would have paid earlier for a license.”).
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Accordingly, under Microsoft and Apple, innovators are pressured to begin
at FRAND, and only go lower. Even more troubling, this effect will
compound itself as innovators pursue further licenses. Once the first
implementer has taken a license, the next implementer will point to the
“nondiscriminatory” aspect of FRAND to argue that its licensing rate
should not be higher but should certainly be lower. The innovator must
either acquiesce or, again, enter litigation in which it can essentially do no
better and only do worse. The only way out of this downward spiral is,
paradoxically, for the innovator to make an initial offer that it feels is safely
FRAND (or at least sufficiently close to be in good faith) and then to
embrace litigation (and its attended costs and delays) if the implementer
does not accept the initial offer. Accordingly, the end result of this
sequential game theory is a mutual motivation toward litigation and away
from negotiated resolutions, as well an overall devaluation of FRAND–
encumbered patents. This in turn undermines the FRAND–enabled
innovation marketplace.
These difficulties arise out of a misallocation of rights among the
bargaining parties. Under Microsoft and Apple, implementers face no
credible injunction risk from pushing FRAND negotiations into the courts
in search of a lower rate and greater leverage. On the other hand, innovators
face the risk of a breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith claim
merely based on their opening offers alone. This allocation of rights and
risks is particularly misguided since innovators have every reason to avoid
litigation costs and secure immediate revenues by engaging in licensing
negotiations in good faith, whereas implementers inherently gain from
delay, with the gains from reducing the ultimate royalty rate often far
exceeding the typical costs of litigation. The entire situation would be
radically altered by one key change in the rule: the innovator should be
allowed to attack the counteroffer by the implementer because it is below
the permissible range of a FRAND offer and is thus not in good faith. Only
if both sides are at risk is there pressure for mutual good faith negotiations.
The recent case of Core Wireless v. LG Electronics illustrates the
dangers of a one–sided legal regime. In 2011, Microsoft and Nokia jointly
formed Core Wireless to hold approximately 2,000 Nokia patents covering
both standard–essential technologies and nonessential implementation
technologies.110 The portfolio was then assigned to Conversant Intellectual
Property Management, an experienced patent licensing specialist, who
assumed responsibility for licensing the portfolio, as well as all associated
110. See Ben Dummett, Nokia Sells 2,000 Patents, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2011).
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patent litigation and patent prosecution legal costs, in exchange for a
revenue sharing agreement with Nokia and Microsoft.111 Conversant
initiated negotiations with LG Electronics, among others. As the district
court observed in awarding enhanced infringement damages against LG
five years later:
After a long series of meetings between the parties, including
seven meetings in Seoul, Korea, LG invited Core Wireless
representatives to Korea one last time and indicated that it would
be making a monetary offer for a license. Rather than make an
offer or engage in serious, good faith negotiations, LG delivered
a terse one-page presentation stating that a lawsuit was
“preferable” to a license, and that LG would prefer to wait until
another major cell phone manufacturer licensed the portfolio, at
which point LG intended to be “a follower” in the established
royalty scheme.112

In other words, LG appears to have pursued a path of “patent holdout”
and “efficient infringement.” And while Core Wireless ultimately prevailed
in litigation, it was forced to expend nearly $6.8 million in legal fees and
expert fees,113 and incur many years of delay, in order to obtain an award of
$2.736 million.114 Thus, as Core Wireless illustrates, the dangers of an
initial misallocation of legal rights and obligations in the FRAND context
are not merely theoretical or academic, but are real and powerful. Absent a
credible injunction threat, LG appears to have faced no compelling reason
to bargain in good faith, and instead invited litigation, driven—according to
the district court—“not by the merits or strength of its non-infringement and
invalidity defenses,” but rather “by its resistance to being the first in the
industry to take a license,”115 and its apparent calculation that the potential
benefits from the litigation game, from its standpoint, were more than worth
the candle.
Correcting the pervasive effects of these misguided incentives requires
changing the incentives themselves. Thus, the better approach is to hold, as
noted above, that an implementer has a concrete and reciprocal duty to
111. Id.
112. See Core Wireless Licensing S.a.r.l. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-912-JRG,
2016 WL 10749825, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2016).
113. See Core Wireless’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expert Witness Fees at *1
n.1, Core Wireless Licensing S.a.r.l. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-912-JRG (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 30, 2016), 2016 WL 10749825.
114. See Core Wireless, 2016 WL 10749825, at *2. Core Wireless also moved for an
award of attorneys’ fees and expert fees. These motions are pending as of this writing.
115. See id.
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negotiate a FRAND license in good faith, and that a breach of that duty
automatically and necessarily gives rise to an injunction, which an
innovator may pursue at the outset of the litigation. To the extent such an
approach must be tied to the eBay four–factor test, it would be supported
under factor three—“that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted”—which should be
the only relevant consideration under such circumstances.116 Under that
approach, an implementer may not respond to an innovator’s first offer with
a lawsuit, but instead must make a good faith offer in furtherance of a
FRAND agreement and must have that offer rejected before it can sue the
innovator for breach of the FRAND duties.117 In other words, the
implementer has no cause of action for breach of the FRAND commitment
until it has made a good faith offer of its own. Moreover, if an implementer
rejects a good–faith FRAND offer from an innovator, the implementer is
automatically subject to an injunction if the patents at issue are adjudicated
to be valid and infringed. The injunction would not apply if the innovator’s
offer is found to be outside the good–faith range of FRAND, and an
injunction would also not be available if the implementer is found to have
made a good–faith pre–suit FRAND offer. Finally, an implementer that has
made a good–faith offer and either received no counteroffer or a bad–faith
counteroffer may sue the innovator. If the claim prevails, the innovator must
grant a license in accordance with the implementer’s good–faith pre–suit
offer and must also pay the implementers reasonable attorneys’ fees.
The above approach moves the parties away from the courtroom and
toward the negotiating table, where they can craft mutually agreeable
solutions to their licensing disputes against the backdrop of balanced legal
rights and remedies for bad–faith conduct on either side.
116. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
117. Judge Leonard Davis made similar observations in Ericsson v. D-Link Systems,
where he noted:
RAND licensing also includes an obligation to negotiate in good faith.
This obligation is a two-way street. As potential licensees in a RAND
negotiation, Defendants possessed an obligation to negotiate in good
faith and earnestly seek an amicable royalty rate. They failed to do so.
Defendants’ entire argument boils down to the fact that they believed
Ericsson’s initial RAND offer was too high. However, Ericsson’s $0.50
offer was only the starting point in the negotiations. Defendants never
meaningfully engaged Ericsson in RAND licensing negotiations after the
initial offer. Further, the fact that the RAND rate was ultimately litigated
in court does not make Ericsson’s initial offer unreasonable.
Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225, at *25 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Indeed, in July 2015, the European Union Court of Justice (“CJEU”)
adopted a similar approach in Huawei v. ZTE, in which it stated that a
FRAND–encumbered patent holder may seek and obtain an injunction if:
(1) it first gives the alleged infringer notice of its claims and the basis for its
infringement allegations, including identifying the relevant standards
provisions to which its patents are alleged to be essential, as well as a
specific written offer on FRAND terms that identifies the royalty amount
and how it is calculated; and (2) the implementer does not “diligently”
respond with a good–faith response, i.e., neither accepts the innovator’s
offer nor makes a specific FRAND counteroffer.118
Like the approach proposed above, and unlike in Microsoft, the CJEU’s
approach in Huawei does not allow an implementer to pursue claims against
the innovator for breach of the FRAND agreement unless the implementer
has at least provided a good–faith FRAND counteroffer, and thus promotes
negotiation and cooperative solutions between implementers and
innovators.119
The United Kingdom’s High Court of Justice (Patents) further advanced
these principles in its recent decision in Unwired Planet v. Huawei.120
Unwired Planet correctly recognized that “eliminating holdup value is not
the only consideration to take into account” when seeking to apply
FRAND.121 Rather, “[i]n order to arrive at fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory license terms the patentee must not engage in hold up nor
must the licensee engage in hold out.”122 In order to create the proper
incentives for such mutual good–faith conduct by licensors and licensees,
Unwired Planet put forth the following two significant holdings.
First, Unwired Planet made clear that a licensee will not have a
meritorious cause of action for anticompetitive conduct against a licensor
who has simply sought a royalty rate that is “higher than the true FRAND
rate.”123 Rather, “for a royalty to amount to excessive pricing it would have
to be substantially more than FRAND,” i.e., “a royalty rate can be at least
somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to
competition law.”124 Thus, an innovator’s licensing offers that are made “as
a step in negotiation” should not give rise to a cause of action by the
118. Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477, 60–71.
119. See also Ericsson, 2013 WL 4046225, at *16 (“Intel cannot rely on its failure to
negotiate to prove Ericsson’s failure to make a legitimate license offer.”).
120. Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (U.K.).
121. Id. ¶ 95.
122. Id. ¶ 96.
123. Id. ¶ 153.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
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implementer, even if the offers are ultimately determined to be “a number
of times higher” than an adjudicated FRAND rate, so long as the offers were
not intended to “prejudice or disrupt the negotiation,” i.e., were made in
good faith.125 Relatedly, an innovator should not be deprived of the
injunctive remedy simply because its pre–suit offers were above the
ultimately adjudicated FRAND rate, and does not engage in “premature
litigation” by commencing an infringement suit before first making an offer
that is later determined to be truly FRAND.126
Second, Unwired Planet held that an injunction should apply to an
implementer found to infringe a valid patent and who “refuses to take a
license on terms found by the court to be FRAND.”127 In such
circumstances, the implementer should “not be entitled to the protection
from injunctions provided for by the patentee’s FRAND undertaking” and
instead would be properly “coerced” into taking a license on FRAND
terms.128
In stark contrast to the correct incentives and policies advanced by the
Huawei v. ZTE and Unwired Planet v. Huawei decisions, the IEEE’s 2015
policy revisions have only sown discord and undermined the FRAND
framework’s basic purpose of bringing innovators and implementers into an
innovation–driven standardization marketplace. For instance, since the
IEEE adopted its highly one–sided injunction policy, key innovation
contributors including Qualcomm, Nokia, Ericsson, and InterDigital have
refused to abide by the policy revision and have also refused to make further
FRAND commitments to the IEEE on those terms.129
Similarly, the Federal Circuit and IEEE’s “clarification” efforts with
respect to the damages remedy in the FRAND context, i.e., “reasonable
royalties,” have also heavily skewed the playing field in implementers’
favor and thus created further distortionary effects and inefficiencies that
undermine the FRAND regime.

125. Id. ¶¶ 783–84.
126. Id. ¶ 755.
127. Id. ¶ 806(5).
128. Id. ¶ 167.
129. See, e.g., Richard Lloyd, The IEEE’s New Patent Policy One Year on—the Battle
That’s Part of a Bigger Licensing War, IAM (May 6, 2016), http://www.iammedia.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e8f72d6e-a3f8-45d8-882f-3ebdd3a1d69e; Susan Decker &
Ian King, Qualcomm Says It Won’t Follow New Wi-Fi Rules on Patents, BLOOMBERG
TECH. (Feb. 11, 2015, 2:29 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0211/qualcomm-says-new-wi-fi-standard-rules-unfair-may-not-take-part.
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As previously noted, a central purpose of the FRAND structure is to
ensure that innovators are “adequately and fairly rewarded”130 for the use
of their technologies and are “motivated to contribute their patented
technologies to the standards-development process.”131 As SDOs like ETSI
and ITU have long recognized and witnessed firsthand, patented
innovations contribute enormous value to the standardization process and
to the success of the standards and the products that implement them. Given
innovators’ contributions to the success of innovation–driven
standardization efforts like Wi-Fi and 4G, a “reasonable royalty” approach
intended to “adequately and fairly” compensate innovators and to
“motivate” their continued contributions to the standards development
process should allocate some portion of the gains from standardization back
to innovators.
Yet the courts have repeatedly held otherwise.132 Most notably in
Ericsson v. D-Link Systems, Inc.,133 the Federal Circuit held that the
calculation of a reasonable royalty award for SEPs “should reflect the
approximate value of [the patent’s] technological contribution, not the value
of its widespread adoption due to standardization.”134 In other words,
Ericsson held that “any royalty award must be based on the incremental
value of the invention, not the value of the standard as a whole or any
increased value the patented feature gains from its inclusion in the
standard.”135
The Federal Circuit reached that holding through heavy reliance on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Garretson v. Clark,136 which the Ericsson
court concluded “requires apportionment of the value of the patented
technology from the value of its standardization.”137 The court’s reasoning
began with the correct legal premise that a “patent holder should only be
compensated for the approximate incremental benefit derived from his
invention,”138 but then veered off course by assuming, without any evidence
130. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 20, at 35.
131. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 30.
132. By missing the basic point of FRAND, courts demonstrate a continuing lack of
understanding and appreciation for organizational innovations. See OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
192–93 (1975).
133. 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
134. Id. at 1233.
135. Id. at 1235.
136. 111 U.S. 120 (1884).
137. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(emphasis added).
138. Id. (citing Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)).
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or meaningful analysis, that “widespread adoption due to standardization”
is not an inherent benefit contributed by standard essential patents, and on
that basis concluded that a SEP holder should derive no value from the gains
associated with the standardization of its patented technology.139
The Federal Circuit subsequently reiterated Ericsson’s holding in
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
(“CSIRO”) v. Cisco Systems,140 where it perpetuated the misguided notion
that innovators are not rightly entitled to share in the “benefit created by
standardization—benefit that would otherwise flow to consumers and
businesses practicing the standard.”141 Applying Ericsson, the court vacated
the district court’s reasonable–royalty determination, which was based on
actual licensing offers and discussions between the parties themselves, and
instructed the lower court on remand to both “consider[ ] the standard’s role
in causing commercial success” of the adjudicated infringing products and
to consider an adjustment, i.e., a decrease, to its royalty determination “for
standardization.”142
And in March 2015, the IEEE incorporated this aspect of Ericsson into
its IPR Policy, stating that a “Reasonable Rate” must exclude “the value, if
any, resulting from inclusion of that [SEP] in the IEEE Standard.”143
The error underlying the above aspects of Ericsson and CSIRO is, as
noted earlier, a failure to distinguish between two very different types of
standards–creation processes: those that merely pick one uniform approach
from a range of essentially equivalent alternatives, and those that develop
technological advancements by evaluating and bringing together next–
generation innovations for the widest impact and dissemination through
standardization. These development standards seek to identify next–
generation innovations and to promote the widespread dissemination of
those cutting–edge innovations through standardization. The 802.11 Wi-Fi
standards, which were at issue in Ericsson and CSIRO, fall into that latter
category, as do the successive generations of cellular telecommunications
standards, from 2G through 5G.144
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1233.
809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1305–06.
IEEE, supra note 10, § 6.1 at 16.
For an example, see the ETSI’s explanation of “What We Do,” which states:
We facilitate the early exchange of information between the research and
standardization communities. Researchers benefit from early exposure
to the issues they face in industrial take-up of their ideas. Industry
benefits from faster exploitation of research results. Research input is
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The apportionment requirement of Ericsson and CSIRO makes sense in
the former context, i.e., technology–agnostic “standard setting,” which, by
definition, derives no particular benefit from selecting one approach over
another.
But Ericsson and CSIRO’s apportionment requirement (and the IEEE’s
adoption of that requirement) is wholly misguided when applied to the latter
context of innovation–driven standards development. In this scenario, it
would be virtually impossible to achieve meaningful technological
advances across generations of standards without the close participation and
extensive technological contributions of innovators like Qualcomm, Nokia,
and Ericsson. And those innovative contributions are the result of
significant risk and investment145—exceeding billions of dollars per
year146—which innovators undertook with the full expectation of “adequate
and fair” returns as set forth in their FRAND contractual agreements.
Properly understood, the standards–development process is a collaborative
joint venture between innovators and implementers in which both parties
seek to maximize the commercial success of their respective contributions,
including through widespread adoption of the standards and thus the
creation of a widespread market for their innovations and products. Having
achieved that goal, both parties to the venture should share in the benefits
of their mutual standardization efforts.
By requiring apportionment of the value of standardization in all cases,
Ericsson and CSIRO appear to conflate innovation–driven standards
development (which was relevant to those cases) with technology–agnostic

very relevant in early study phases, when alternative technical solutions
have to be evaluated.
ETSI, What We Do: From Research to Standards, http://www.etsi.org/about/what-wedo/research [https://perma.cc/4QH7-LWAL]
145. David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A Law and
Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1489 (2017).
146. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Qualcomm Incorporated In Support of Neither
Party at *2, Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35393), 2014
WL 4802385 (noting that Qualcomm invests $5 billion per year in research and
development, amounting to 20% of its annual revenues).
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standards setting (which was not),147 148 thereby depriving innovators of
rightfully earned returns on their extensive R&D investments and
contributions to successful standardization. This, in turn, further depresses
the value of standard–essential patents and further rewrites the FRAND
bargain to the detriment of innovators and, ultimately, innovation.149
Garretson—which was decided in 1884 and neither faced nor addressed
any of the above standards–related considerations—should not be literally
applied to cases like Ericsson and CSIRO. Rather, consistent with
Garretson and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,150 SEP
infringement damages should reflect the value of the patentee’s contribution
to the product’s commercial success, including through innovation–driven
standards development.
Indeed, the vast majority of innovation–driven SDOs appear to disagree
with Ericsson, CSIRO, and the IEEE on this issue, as no major SDO other
than the IEEE has incorporated such an apportionment requirement into its
IPR policy. Moreover, the IEEE’s incorporation of the Ericsson
147. See Ericsson v. D-Link Systems, Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
When a technology is incorporated into a standard, it is typically chosen
from among different options. Once incorporated and widely adopted,
that technology is not always used because it is the best or the only
option; it is used because its use is necessary to comply with the standard.
In other words, widespread adoption of standard essential technology is
not entirely indicative of the added usefulness of an innovation over the
prior art.
Id.; see also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Res. Org. v. Cisco Sys., 809 F.3d 1295, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he value of the technology . . . is distinct from any value that
artificially accrues to the patent due to the standard’s adoption. Without this rule, patentees
would receive all of the benefit created by standardization—benefit that would otherwise
flow to consumers and businesses practicing the standard.”).
148. See supra Part II (distinguishing between technology–agnostic standard setting
such as picking a side of the road to drive on and innovation–driven standards
development).
149. See J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable
Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1809, 1867 (2016). Professor Sidak
explains:
No economic or normative justification supports the assumption that all
of the seller surplus from the standard should accrue to the implementers.
Without the SEP holder’s contribution to the value of the standard, the
implementer’s profit from the sale of the end product that practices the
standard would not exist. There is no economically sound reason to deny
an SEP holder any portion of the value of the standard that it helped to
create.
Id.; see also id. at 1862–67.
150. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (developing an influential set of factors that
courts consider when calculating reasonable royalties).
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apportionment rule has led to the aforementioned mutiny by numerous
members, including Qualcomm, InterDigital, Ericsson, and Nokia, who
have refused to make FRAND assurances under the March 2015 policy.151
And an analysis of the IEEE’s response to members’ opposition to that
revision has identified “a statistically significant bias against the firms that
opposed the bylaw amendments—primarily large SEP holders—and in
favor of revisions designed to devalue SEPs.”152
In sum, what is wholly lacking from this one–sided approach is an
awareness that opportunism and holdups are a two–way street. A firm that
invests heavily in a patent that reads onto a standard may be met by a refusal
to deal from a potential FRAND licensee, who claims that the rate is above
some supposed competitive rate of return. But beneath the objection lies the
simple point that the refusal to accept terms may well deprive that patentee
of the rate of return needed to make its investment worthwhile, just as can
happen with common carriers and public utilities if faced with confiscatory
rates. Therefore, in the abstract, the risks are far from symmetrical. Indeed,
the greater the hue and cry about exploitation by the patentee, the more
likely it is that the potential licensee can reduce the terms, knowing that
injunctions will only be issued in rare cases that are not relevant to routine
business transactions. Therefore, at this point, whenever the specter of
bilateral opportunism arises, where does the greater peril lie? In many
instances, the most likely source of abuse lies with the putative licensee,
who already has what it wanted (use of the innovator’s valuable technology
as part of its products and the standard) and who (absent a court order) can
profit from that technology through its product sales without paying
anything to the innovator at all. And the prospective licensee’s incentives
for such opportunism only increase once it has little or no SEPs of its own
to license out. The same situation arises when its counterparty is purely an
innovator or patent holder, rather than an innovator–implementer. In such
circumstances, the putative licensee in this round has little concern for
maintaining good will with the putative licensor, as their roles will not be
reversed in future rounds, thereby further weakening the elaborate set of
soft institutional and social constraints that bind parties who both contribute
patents to the SDO standard and practice that standard.
Refreshingly, the UK’s High Court of Justice has recently pushed back
against the implementer–centric tendencies of American courts and the
IEEE. In Unwired Planet, the High Court held that FRAND does not
compel that “the patentee could not appropriate some of the value that is
151. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
152. See Sidak, supra note 9, at 333.
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associated with the inclusion of his technology into the standard and the
value of the products that are using those standards,” and that it is “not
necessary to deprive the patentee of its fair share of those two sources of
value in order to eliminate hold up and fulfill the purpose of FRAND.”153
Indeed, that point was undisputed by both sides in the Unwired Planet
matter notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Ericsson and
CSIRO.154
V.

IMPLEMENTER–CENTRICISM IN ITS LARGER LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

As we have shown, the misguided judicial and policy approaches we
discuss in this Article appear driven by a presumptive and pervasive
prejudice in favor of implementers and against innovators. The central
thrust of that view is to minimize returns to innovation inputs via attractive
but false theories like royalty stacking, all in order to augment returns to
commercial embodiments and thus ensure (so the theory goes) that the
production of commercial embodiments can continue.155 These same
philosophical foundations underlie the eBay decision, in which Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence appeared to sound an alarm by observing that “[a]n
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees,”156 and which courts (particularly in America) have subsequently
applied in a manner that effectively precludes the injunction remedy to
companies that do not produce their own commercial embodiments of their
inventions.157
Although we demonstrate and explore that object–centric bias through
a focus on FRAND and the mobile handset marketplace, the sources of that
bias run much deeper, and its troubling implications reach far beyond
standard–reliant industries.
This bias arises because our commercial society is fundamentally built
to value, protect, and reward “things” or “objects” rather than “ideas”—
objects that embody innovations, but not necessarily the underlying
innovations themselves. The ultimate consequence of our current “objects
153. Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [¶ 97] (U.K.).
154. Id.
155. See Barnett, supra note 9; Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Lew Zaretzki,
Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in the World Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 1527 (2017).
156. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.
concurring).
157. See Barnett, supra note 9.
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over ideas” framework is that it impedes the development and growth of the
“ideas economy” at its seminal moment. The confused logic of Justice
Kennedy’s position represents a rejection of the basic principle, as old as
Adam Smith, that gains from trade derive from socially productive
specialization in the marketplace, and that free–market actors will allocate
resources where they can secure the highest value. There is thus no reason
to lament, as Justice Kennedy did, that patents have increasingly emerged
as a distinct asset class. Rather, that is precisely the trend that should be
encouraged. As the costs and barriers to manufacturing and implementation
continue to plummet—whether through globalization, robotics, 3D
printing, advances in computing hardware and software, or otherwise—it is
increasingly the ideas themselves, not their implementation, that hold the
greatest value. And it is in this realm of ideas and innovation that human
beings will continue to hold a productive role for the foreseeable future.
If we are to move into this next phase of our economic existence, ideas
must be protectable, transactable, and monetizable. Our legal rules and
social norms must recognize and allocate value and primacy to innovation,
while also embracing a new economic order in which the development of
commercial embodiments becomes a low–margin industry. Most notably,
an efficient marketplace for innovation necessarily allows specialization
between innovators and implementers, rather than forcing an increasingly
inefficient vertical integration between the two. Thus, in Silicon Valley 2.0,
brilliant young entrepreneurs should not be distracted by developing and
selling their innovations as products, but rather should be able to develop
firms that occupy the far more impactful (and lucrative) role of generating
and transacting ideas alone.
This Article thus focuses on the treatment of FRAND–encumbered
standard–essential patents because that subject is at the forefront of these
far broader issues. By and large, FRAND–encumbered SEPs are not vague,
abstract, infinitely broad, whimsical, or practically irrelevant. They
encompass and protect precise, narrow, and concrete engineering
innovations that are the results of billions of dollars in research and
development and millions of hours of grinding labor,158 trial and error, and
occasional genius by engineers who know their field of art and continually
work to advance it. These mere ideas yield real benefits and real results. It
is these ideas that have moved us from 2G to 3G to 4G and now on to 5G,
enabling billions and even trillions of dollars in economic gains. It is these
158. See Alexander Galetovic & Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential
Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry 19–20 (Hoover
Inst. Working Grp. on Intellectual Prop., Innovation, & Prosperity, Working Paper No.
15012, 2016), https://hooverip2.org/wp-content/uploads/ip2-wp15012-paper.pdf.
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ideas that have led to the magic of Wi-Fi. We have all enjoyed their massive
benefits, and it is only logical that our commercial legal regime should
enable the protection, transaction, and monetization of such innovations as
standalone assets.
The patent system is currently our most sophisticated mechanism for
achieving that aim. Thus, the anti–patent, anti–licensing, and anti–innovator
trends we identify here represent precisely the wrong approach at exactly
the wrong time. Rather than working from the premise that the FRAND
marketplace is inherently flawed and that one side of the bargain requires
continuous and significant judicial protection against systematic abuse from
the other, courts, legislators, regulators, and academics should recognize
that it is the very combination of strong property rights for innovation and
strong enforcement of voluntary contractual arrangements that has brought
us this far—and that this approach is the only one that can take us further.
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